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I. INTRODUCTION 
These comments are in response to the “Request for Information Concerning Labor 
Rights in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua and their Laws 
Governing Exploitative Child Labor” published at 68 Fed. Reg. 19580 (April 21, 2003). 
This Request for Information was issued pursuant to Section 2102(c)(8) and (9) of the 
Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-210, which requires the President, with respect to any 
proposed trade agreement, to submit to Congress a “meaningful labor rights report” and a 
“report describing the extent to which the country or countries that are parties to the 
agreement have in effect laws governing exploitative child labor.” 
This submission incorporates by reference the comments on the draft U.S. proposal 
for the labor rights chapter of the U.S. - Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) submitted by the AFL-CIO to the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
on May 5, 2003; comments submitted by the AFL-CIO to USTR on market access in 
CAFTA on May 14, 2003; and earlier comments on the proposed CAFTA submitted to 
USTR in November, 2002. It also incorporates by reference the petitions filed by the 
AFL-CIO with USTR for the withdrawal of benefits under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) for Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador, on the grounds that these 
countries have not been and are not taking steps to afford internationally-recognized 
worker rights. The Costa Rica petition was filed with USTR in June, 2001, and the 
Guatemala and El Salvador petitions in December, 2002. USTR has not announced 
whether any of these petitions will be accepted for review. 
II. OVERVIEW OF LABOR RIGHTS AND DEVELOMENT IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
Central America stands at a crossroads in its economic development. For the past 
decade, the strategy of the region’s governments, supported by the international financial 
institutions, has been to attempt to compete in low-wage exports to the United States 
(agricultural commodities and textiles and apparel) while shrinking the public sector 
through a combination of privatization and retrenchment. These changes, accomplished 
at great human cost and often accompanied by serious labor rights violations, have 
significantly restructured the Central American economies. It is less clear whether they 
have improved living standards, security, or democratic opportunities. 
The next decade presents a new set of challenges. With much of their infrastructure 
now in private hands, governments can no longer count on revenue from the sale of 
public institutions. At the same time, the elimination of textile and apparel quotas on 
December 31, 2004 will thrust Central America into direct competition with China and 
other low-wage Asian producers. 
A recent report, commissioned by USAID, spells out the potential impact of the quota 
phase-out on the countries of the Caribbean Basin. The report concludes that “[a]mong 
suppliers to the U.S. market, Mexico and countries in the Caribbean and sub-Saharan 
Africa that benefit from preferential access under programs, such as the Caribbean Basin 
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Initiative (CBI), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), are at a particularly high risk." Preferential trade 
agreements, the report concludes, will offer far less protection to developing countries 
that are forced into direct competition with China. Indeed, in sectors that have already 
been opened to direct competition, China has sucked up almost all of the global market. 
The response of the Central American and other developing country governments, the 
report argues, must be to develop comprehensive strategies for competitiveness that 
depend less on keeping wages low, and more on improving quality, skills, and 
productivity. Adherence to international labor standards, the report suggests, should be 
an integral part of this strategy. 
The AFL-CIO and the trade unions of Central America, in their joint declaration of 
November 2002 on the proposed CAFTA, emphasize that: 
... economic development and the intensification of trade in the region should 
contribute to raising the living standards of all people, and should strengthen respect 
for fundamental human and environmental rights through a better distribution of 
income between the developed and the underdeveloped countries and within each 
national society, thereby making the process of integration an instrument for the 
promotion of social development and the strengthening of democracy .... We believe 
that a more just and humane integration - a system designed to eliminate the 
enormous social and economic inequities at both national and international levels - is 
possible and desirable if it incorporates the requirements discussed above, including: 
strong and effective mechanisms to protect labor and social rights; compensation 
policies to correct inequities resulting from restructuring; mechanisms for 
transparency and participation; clear policies against corruption; fair rules for 
investment, services, agriculture, and the environment; a more humane migration 
regime; and debt relief policies. 
A. Labor Laws in Central American Countries Fall Far Short of International Core 
Labor Standards 
The governments of Central America have accepted international obligations to 
respect fundamental labor rights. As member states of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), all of the Central American countries are bound by the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. In addition, all of these 
1
 Nathan Associates, Inc., Changes in Global Trade Rules for Textiles and Apparel: Implications for 
Developing Countries (November 20, 2002), available at www.nathaninc.com. 
2
 Id. 
3
 Labor Movement Declaration Concerning the United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement, San 
Jose, Costa Rica, November 18, 2002. 
4
 According to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, “all Members, even if 
they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of 
membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with 
the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those 
Conventions.” Therefore, even countries that have not ratified ILO Convention No. 87 concerning freedom 
of association and the right to organize and ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the right to organize and 
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countries except El Salvador have ratified ILO Convention No. 87 on freedom of 
association and the right to organize and Convention No. 98 on the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. Ratified ILO Conventions have the force of law in each of these 
countries, to differing degrees. 
The Central American governments are also bound by other international instruments 
to respect core labor rights. All of these governments have ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights and accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human 
Rights Court (El Salvador accepted jurisdiction consistent with its Constitution). Article 
16 of the American Convention guarantees freedom of association, with specific 
reference to trade unions. In addition, all of these countries except Honduras have 
ratified the Protocol of San Salvador, Article 8 of which affirms freedom of association 
and the right to strike. (Nicaragua has ratified the Protocol but has not deposited it). 
Without exception, the national legal systems of the Central American countries fail 
to meet the norms established by these international instruments. The following is an 
overview of some of the most serious and systemic problems. 
1. Inadequate Protections against Anti-Union Discrimination 
ILO Convention No. 98 requires governments to provide adequate protections against 
acts of anti-union discrimination. The ILO Committee of Experts, in explaining 
government obligations under Convention No. 98, has stated that, “The existence of 
general legal provisions prohibiting acts of anti-union discrimination is not enough if they 
are not accompanied by effective and rapid procedures to ensure their application in 
practice.” The ILO goes on to state that the test for whether or not the legal procedures 
meet the requirements of Convention No. 98 is that the procedures, “prevent or 
effectively redress anti-union discrimination, and allow union representatives to be 
reinstated in their posts and continue to hold their trade union office according to their 
constituents’ wishes.” The ILO has further emphasized the importance of reinstatement 
requirements: “Legislation which allows the employer in practice to terminate the 
employment of a worker on condition that he pay the compensation provided for by law 
in any case of unjustified dismissal, when the real motive is the worker's union 
membership or activity, is inadequate under the terms of Article 1 of the Convention." 
Central American labor laws fail to meet this test. They do not provide “effective and 
rapid” procedures for prosecuting acts of anti-union discrimination, and the remedies 
bargain collectively are bound by this obligation. International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session, Geneva, June 18, 1998. 
5
 Article 1, para 1 of Convention No. 98 states that “Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of 
anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment.” Article 3 of Convention No. 98 goes on to state 
that “Machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established, where necessary, for the purpose of 
ensuring respect for the right to organize ...” as defined in the rest of the Convention. 
6
 International Labour Conference, 1994, Freedom of association and collective bargaining: Protection 
against acts of anti-union discrimination, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, 81st Session, Geneva, 1994, Report III (Part 4B), para. 214 - 224. 
[hereinafter Committee of Experts Report]. 
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available in the laws are so weak that they fail to “prevent or effectively redress” anti-
union discrimination. As a result, employers suspend and dismiss union organizers with 
impunity throughout the Central American region. This is an effective and widely used 
method of weakening or eliminating unions, as it prevents union leaders from entering 
the workplace and interacting with other union members. 
• In El Salvador, an employer can legally fire or suspend union leaders so long as it 
pays their salaries and benefits until the end of the protected period. 
Reinstatement is not required, allowing employers to pay a small price to keep 
their factories union-free. The ILO and the U.S. State Department have criticized 
El Salvador’s weak remedies for anti-union discrimination. 
• El Salvador’s law allows employers to circumvent even these weak penalties for 
anti-union discrimination by suspending production. The Labor Code of El 
Salvador specifies eighteen reasons for which an employer can legally suspend 
workers. Eleven can be unilaterally invoked without prior administrative or 
judicial authorization. One of the most commonly cited is an “act of God,” 
defined to include such things as insufficient product orders, or “lack of raw 
material,” when not the fault of the employer. A suspension for an “act of God” 
or “lack of raw materials” can legally last for nine months and often creates 
economic pressures for workers to resign, since they are rarely willing or able to 
wait that long, without pay, for possible reinstatement. These provisions can be 
used as a tool to coerce workers. There is evidence that some employers use them 
in lieu of declaring plant closures, thereby avoiding paying workers the full 
severance pay due if operations are closed, and workers fired without just cause. 
There is also some evidence that employers have used these provisions selectively 
against unionized workers. By invoking such provisions to force resignations, 
employers can avoid running afoul of the Labor Code prohibition on firing 
workers to destroy a union. 
• In addition, El Salvador’s laws undercut workers’ right to organize by failing to 
protect workers against anti-union discrimination in hiring. Employers can refuse 
to hire individuals identified on a “blacklist” as suspected or actual trade union 
members or supporters. According to the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
7
 The State Department discussed this deficiency in its human rights report for El Salvador for 2001: “the 
Labor Code does not require the employers to reinstate them [workers fired for union activities], but 
requires the employers to provide a severance payment. In practice, some employers dismissed workers 
who sought to form unions. The Government generally ensured that employers paid severance to these 
workers. However, in most case the Government did not prevent their dismissal or require their 
reinstatement. Workers and the ILO reported instances of employers using illegal pressure to discourage 
organizing, including the dismissal of labor activists and the maintenance of lists of workers who would not 
be hired because they had belonged to unions.” U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices. 
8
 Labor Code, articles 36-38. 
9
 Labor Code, article 44. 
10
 Human Rights Watch, Comments Concerning El Salvador’s Failure to Protect Workers’ Human Rights. 
11
 Blacklisting has been a common practice in El Salvador for many years, especially in the maquilas. See 
USAID/SETEFE/MTPS, Informe del Monitoreo de las maquilas y Recintos Fiscales (July 2000), available 
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Association, protection against anti-union discrimination should cover the periods 
of recruitment and hiring, as well as employment and dismissal.12 Nevertheless, 
the Labor Code prohibits discrimination or retaliation against “workers” for 
engaging in union activity,13 thereby extending this protection only to those 
already employed and allowing the practice of blacklisting to continue.14 
In Nicaragua, Articles 45 and 48 of the Labor Code allow employers to fire union 
organizers as long as they pay them double severance payments. No 
reinstatement is required. The U.S. State Department has reported that “Business 
leaders sometimes use this practice [of paying double severance to fire union 
organizers] to stymie unionization attempts.”15 
In Honduras, Section 517 of the Labor Code provides for protection against 
dismissal, transfer or the downgrading of working conditions without just cause 
for workers who notify the employer and the General Directorate of Labor that 
they intend to organize a trade union, but this protection lasts only until the trade 
union obtains legal personality. In addition, section 469 of the Honduran Labor 
Code, amended by Decree No. 978 of 1980, punishes anti-union discrimination 
with a very small fine of from 200 to 10,000 lempiras (approximately US$12 -
$600). The ILO has repeatedly criticized the inadequacy of Honduran labor laws 
on anti-union discrimination.16 
In Guatemala, there is widespread failure to comply with final court decisions 
ordering the reinstatement in their jobs of workers dismissed for trade union 
activities, in part because fines for failure to obey these orders are set very low. 
The ILO Committee of Experts has asked the government of Guatemala to amend 
section 414 of the Penal Code to strengthen the penalties for failure to obey the 
orders and sentences of the judicial authority. The ILO found the amount of fines 
“quite out of date,” so that final decisions imposing penalties for anti-union 
discrimination are not effectively complied with.17 
at www.nlcnet.org/campaigns/archive/elsalvador/0401/arlcover.shtml; National Labor Committee, Paying 
to Lose Our Jobs (1992), available at www.nlcnet.org/haitirep.htm . A recent investigation by the Worker 
Rights Consortium found evidence of widespread blacklisting in the San Bartolo Free Trade Zone. Worker 
Rights Consortium, Assessment re Primo S.A. de C.V. (El Salvador) , Preliminary Findings and 
Recommendations (March 19, 2003), available at www.workersrights.org. 
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, General (Protection against anti-union discrimination), 
Digest of Decisions, Doc. 1201, 1996, para. 695. 
Labor Code, articles 30(5), 205(c). “Workers” are defined as employees or laborers. Labor Code, article 
2. 
Human Rights Watch, Comments Concerning El Salvador’s Failure to Protect Workers’ Human Rights. 
U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
In 2002, the ILO Committee of Experts recalled that it has been referring for years to Honduras’s need 
for “legislation to provide for adequate protection, particularly sufficiently effective and dissuasive 
sanctions, against acts of anti-union discrimination for trade union membership or activities.” International 
Labor Organization, Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
[hereinafter ILO CEACR], Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 98, Honduras, 2002. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 98, Guatemala, 2002. 
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• In Costa Rica, anti-union discrimination is not prosecuted quickly and effectively. 
The ILO has criticized Costa Rica for failing to improve its laws in this area and 
bring them into compliance with Convention No. 98. The government of Costa 
Rica submitted a bill to amend the Labor Code to provide for: rapid procedures 
prior to dismissal which have to be discharged by the employer; summary 
proceedings before the judicial authorities with compulsory time limits to 
ascertain the reasons for the dismissal of a union official; and severe penalties for 
refusal to reinstate the worker where justified grounds are not found to exist. This 
bill is still not law. 
2. Obstacles to Union Registration 
Some governments in Central America establish onerous registration requirements to 
prevent workers from exercising their right to freedom of association. This violates 
Article 2 of ILO core Convention No. 87 on freedom of association and the right to 
organize, which guarantees the right of workers and employers to establish organizations 
of their own choosing “without previous authorization” from the public authorities. 
Article 7 of the Convention goes on to state that, “The acquisition of legal personality by 
workers’ and employers’ organizations ... shall not be made subject to conditions of such 
a character as to restrict the application of [Article 2].” Requiring a minimum number 
or percentage of workers to establish a union can also violate Article 2 of Convention No. 
87 if the minimum amount is set at an unreasonable level. 
Central American governments violate Convention No. 87 by imposing a variety of 
onerous registration requirements. 
• Article 47 of the El Salvadoran Constitution provides that the norms governing 
union formation “should not hinder freedom of association.” Nonetheless, the 
Labor Code establishes numerous requirements that workers seeking to unionize 
must fulfill. Six months must pass before workers whose application to establish 
a trade union is rejected can submit a new application, and unions must have a 
minimum of thirty-five members. The ILO has observed that the list is so 
extensive and burdensome that it interferes with workers’ right to organize and 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 98, Costa Rica, 2002. 
The ILO Committee of Experts explained this obligation further: “Problems of compatibility with the 
Convention .. .arise where the registration procedure is long and complicated or when registration 
regulations are applied in a manner inconsistent with their purpose and the competent administrative 
authorities make excessive use of their discretionary powers and are encouraged to do so by the vagueness 
of the relevant legislation. These factors may be a serious obstacle to the establishment of organizations 
and may amount to a denial of the right of workers and employers to establish organizations without 
previous authorization.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 75. 
The ILO Committee of Experts states, “problems arise when legislation stipulates that an organization 
may be set up only if it has a certain number of members in the same occupation or enterprise, or when it 
requires a high minimum proportion (sometimes even more than 50 per cent) of workers which, in the latter 
case, in practice precludes the establishment of more than one trade union in each occupation or 
enterprise.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 82. 
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has issued recommendations to streamline union registration. The U.S. State 
Department has also criticized these “excessive formalities." 
• In Honduras, more than 30 workers are required to constitute a trade union. The 
ILO has criticized this legal requirement as a violation of freedom of 
association. 
• In Guatemala, section 216 of the Labor Code requires written proof of the will of 
20 or more workers to form a union, thus making for a written disclosure of pro-
union activists and imposing a literacy requirement. This legal deficiency has 
been criticized by the ILO. 
3. Restrictions on the Right to Organize Above the Enterprise Level 
Central American labor laws contain numerous restrictions on the right to organize 
above the enterprise level. Prohibitive requirements for the formation of enterprise level 
unions can also run afoul of workers’ rights standards by requiring the establishment of a 
de facto trade union monopoly in the industry. 
• In El Salvador, the Labor Code requires that workers in independent public 
institutions form enterprise-based, rather than industry-wide, unions. 
• In Honduras, section 472 of the Labor Code prohibits more than one trade union 
in a single enterprise, institution or establishment. The ILO has criticized this 
legal requirement as a violation of the right to organize. 
• In Guatemala, the Labor Code imposes a prohibitive threshold of 50 per cent plus 
one of all workers in an entire industry to achieve industrial union recognition. 
The U.S. State Department reports that labor activists find this requirement to be, 
“a nearly insurmountable barrier to the formation of new industrial unions.” 
This law also been mentioned as a problem by the ILO. 
4. Restrictions on the Right of Temporary Employees 
21
 ILO, Complaint against the Government of El Salvador presented by Communications International 
(CI), Report No. 313, Case No. 1987, Vol. LXXXII, 1999, Series B., No. 1, para. 117(a). 
22
 U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
23
 ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Honduras, 2002. 
24
 International Labor Conference Committee [hereinafter ILCCR], Examination of individual case 
concerning Convention No. 87, Guatemala, 2002. 
25
 The ILO Committee of Experts states, “Convention No. 87 implies that pluralism should remain possible 
in all cases. Therefore, the law should not institutionalize a factual monopoly; even in a situation where at 
some point all workers have preferred to unify the trade union movement, they should still remain free to 
choose to set up unions outside the established structures should they so wish.” Committee of Experts 
Report, para. 87. 
26
 ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Honduras, 2002. 
27
 U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
28
 ILCCR, Examination of individual case concerning Convention No. 87, Guatemala, 2002. 
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Honduran law allows only “permanent” employees to join unions. By hiring workers 
on a series of temporary contracts, employers have succeeded in denying the right to 
organize to many workers who perform the same tasks as those classified as permanent 
employees. This allows workers to escape unions by converting permanent workers to 
a temporary status, and violates of the right to organize laid out in Convention Nos. 87 
and 98. 
5. Requirements for Union Leadership 
A number of Central American countries require members of union leadership to be 
citizens or to be employed in the represented industry, in violation of guarantees for the 
right to organize in Convention No. 87. 
• In Honduras, officers of a trade union, federation or confederation must be 
Honduran nationals, must be engaged in the corresponding occupational activity, 
and must be able to read and write. The ILO Committee of experts has criticized 
these requirements. 
• In Guatemala, only Guatemalan nationals can participate in the creation of a 
union’s executive committee. In addition, a worker must be from the enterprise 
or occupation represented to be eligible as a trade union leader. The ILO has 
requested amendments to these laws. 
• In Nicaragua, access of foreign nationals to trade union office is restricted. The 
ILO has recommended that this law be changed to permit foreign nationals to take 
up trade union office. 
6. Laws Permitting Employer Domination or Interference 
Generally, Central American labor laws lack explicit provisions prohibiting 
employers from dominating or interfering in union activities. Some countries’ laws allow 
for the operation of employer-dominated solidarity associations, which are used to 
undermine legitimate trade unions. This violates workers’ right to organize and bargain 
collectively. Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98 states that unions shall enjoy adequate 
protection against employer interference, and specifies that “acts which are designed to 
promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers 
See cases of La Mesa and Buenos Amigos plantations, Honduras, infra. 
The ILO Committee of Experts explains that, “Provisions which require all candidates for trade union 
office to belong to the respective occupation, enterprise or production unit or to be actually employed in 
this occupation ... are contrary to the guarantees set forth in Convention No. 87.” On nationality, the ILO 
Committee of Experts states, “Since provisions on nationality which are too strict could deprive some 
workers of the right to elect their representatives in full freedom, for example migrant workers in sectors in 
which they account for a significant share of the workforce, the Committee considers that legislation should 
allow foreign workers to take up trade union office, at least after a reasonable period of residence in the 
host country.” Committee of Experts Report, paras. 117 - 118. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Honduras, 2002. 
ILCCR, Examination of individual case concerning Convention No. 87, Guatemala, 2002. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Nicaragua, 2001. 
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… shall … constitute acts of interference” that workers must be protected from. Article 3 
of the Convention requires governments to establish machinery to ensure respect for the 
rights defined in Article 2 and other Articles of the Convention. Article 4 of the 
Convention requires governments to take measures to promote the “full development and 
utilization” of machinery for collective bargaining between unions and their employers. 
A number of Central American countries fail to protect their workers form employer 
interference, some by allowing solidarity associations to thrive and undermine legitimate 
unions. 
• In Costa Rica “solidarity associations” are permitted by law to present complaints 
on behalf of the workforce. In practice, employers establish and work with these 
associations in order to avoid recognizing and bargaining with legitimate unions 
organized by their employees. The ILO Committee of Experts has criticized these 
provisions. 
• In Nicaragua, the law recognizes employer-created unions, but does not provide 
guidance on how they relate to employee unions in the workplace. In practice, 
employers establish and work with these associations in order to avoid 
recognizing and bargaining with legitimate unions organized by their employees. 
• In Honduras, Section 511 of the Labor Code excludes from eligibility for trade 
union office those members of the union whose duties entail representing the 
employer or who hold positions of management or personal trust or who are 
easily able to exert undue pressure on their colleagues, but does not prohibit other 
acts of employer interference with trade unions. The ILO Committee of Experts 
The ILO Committee of Experts commented on Central American solidarity associations at length: The 
Committee would like to draw attention to the special problem of the solidarist associations which have 
been set up in some Central American countries. Solidarist associations are associations of workers which 
are set up dependent on a financial contribution from the relevant employer and which are financed in 
accordance with the principles of mutual benefit societies by both workers and employers for economic and 
social purposes of material welfare (savings, credit, investment, housing and educational programs, etc.) 
and of unity and cooperation between workers and employers; their deliberative bodies must be made up of 
workers, though an employers’ representative may be included who may speak but not vote. In recent 
years, the Committee on Freedom of Association has on a number of occasions received allegations 
concerning interference by solidarist associations in the industrial relations sphere of the trade unions, 
unequal treatment accorded to trade unions and solidarist associations in legislation and practice, as well as 
control of the latter by employers; all these measures often result in employer interference in trade union 
activities and favoritism towards solidarist associations. The fact that these associations are partly financed 
by employers, although their members include workers as well as senior staff and personnel having the 
employer’s confidence, and that they are often set up at the employers’ initiative, means that they cannot be 
independent organizations, and thus often raises problems as regards the application of Article 2 of the 
Convention. The governments concerned should adopt legislative or other measures to guarantee that 
solidarist associations do not exercise trade union activities, in particular collective bargaining by means of 
‘direct settlements’ between employers and groups of non-unionized workers. Furthermore, these 
governments should take measures to eliminate any inequality of treatment between solidarist associations 
and trade unions, and to ensure that employers abstain from bargaining with this type of association.” 
Committee of Experts Report, para. 233. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 98, Costa Rica, 2002. 
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has criticized these provisions and has recommended legal reforms to address the 
problem. 
7. Restrictions on Federations and Confederations 
A number of Central American governments impose onerous requirements on the 
formation of federations or confederations, or restrict these organizations’ ability to aid 
unions in bargaining or strike actions. These sorts of prohibitions violate workers’ right 
to organize under Convention No. 87. Confederations and federations are given the same 
right to conduct their activities and formulate programs in Article 6 of the Convention 
and workers are guaranteed the right to join federations and confederations in Article 5. 
• Guatemala has increased the number of unions required to form a federation and 
the number of federations required to form a confederation from two to four. 
• In Nicaragua, Section 53 of the Regulation on trade union associations of 1997 
confirms that “in labor disputes, federations and confederations shall only 
intervene to provide advice and the moral or economic support needed by the 
workers concerned.” Federations and confederations may not call strikes. These 
laws have been criticized by the ILO. 
• In Honduras federations are not allowed to call strikes. The ILO has criticized 
this provision as a violation of Convention No. 87. 
8. Limitations on Rights of Public Employees 
Though the rights of public employees to join unions and to bargain with their 
employers are subject to some qualified restrictions under ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 
98, Central American laws go far beyond these rules to impermissibly restrict the rights 
of public sector workers. All workers, including public employees, have a right to “join 
organizations for their own choosing” under Article 2 of Convention No. 87. Armed 
forces and the police are excluded form this right in Article 9 of the Convention. The 
The ILO Committee of Experts noted that, “acts to support workers’ organizations by financial or other 
means are included among the acts of interference referred to in Article 2 of the Convention [No. 98]. ... 
the Committee hopes that the [labor law] reform will include provisions designed to ensure that workers’ 
and employers’ organizations enjoy proper protection against acts of interference by each other, and that 
there are sufficiently effective and dissuasive sanctions against such acts.” ILO CEACR, Individual 
Observation concerning Convention No. 98, Honduras, 2002. 
The ILO Committee of Experts states that “requirement of an excessively large minimum number of 
member organizations .... [to form a federation or confederation is] contrary to the clear provisions of the 
Convention.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 191. The ILO has also affirmed that federations and 
confederations must be permitted to engage in collective bargaining and strike activities. The ILO 
Committee of Experts states, “Provisions of this kind are such as to seriously hinder the development of 
industrial relations, in particular for small trade unions which are not always able to defend the interests of 
their members effectively because they are unable to recruit from their small membership a sufficient 
number of well trained officers.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 195. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Nicaragua, 2001. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Honduras, 2002. 
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ILO Committee of Experts states that, “The Committee has always considered that the 
exclusion of public servants from this fundamental right [to organize] is contrary to the 
Convention." In addition, the scope of public sector workers excluded from the right to 
organize and bargain collectively is narrowly construed to cover only those workers 
“directly employed in the administration of the state." 
Yet Central American labor laws prohibit broad swaths of public employees from 
exercising their right to join unions and bargain with their employers. 
• In Costa Rica, significant categories of public employees in non-essential sectors 
have no right to bargain collectively. The ILO technical assistance mission to 
Costa Rica emphasized, “the confusion, uncertainty and even legal insecurity 
existing with regard to the scope of the right to collective bargaining in the public 
sector in terms of the employees and public servants covered.” And the ILO 
Committee of Experts has expressed its “deep concern” over this situation. 
• In El Salvador, only employees of autonomous agencies have the right to form 
unions, which denies other public sector workers the right to organize. 
• The Nicaraguan government suspended, due to the failure to adopt implementing 
regulations, the Civil Service and Administrative Careers Act of 1990, section 
43(8), which envisages the right to organize, strike and bargain collectively for 
public servants. The ILO has asked the Nicaraguan government to reform its laws 
to recognize the right of public employees to unionize. 
9. Limitations on the Right to Strike 
The right to strike, though not explicitly laid out in ILO Convention No. 87 on 
freedom of association and the right to organize, has consistently been considered by the 
ILO to be an intrinsic part of these core rights. Strikes are understood to be part of a 
trade union’s “activities and ... programs” under Article 3 of Convention No. 87. The 
ILO has also based the right to strike on Article 8, paragraph 2 of Convention No. 87, 
which states that a country’s laws shall not impair workers’ right to freedom of 
association. Onerous procedural requirements for calling a strike can thus violate 
workers’ right to organize by making it difficult or impossible to carry out a legal strike. 
Committee of Experts Report, para. 48. 
The ILO Committee of Experts explains: “The Committee could not allow the exclusion from the terms 
of the Convention of large categories of workers employed by the State merely on the grounds that they are 
formally placed on the same footing as public officials engaged in the administration of the State. The 
distinction must therefore be drawn between, on the one hand, public servants who by their functions are 
directly employed in the administration of the State ... who may be excluded from the scope of the 
Convention and, on the other hand, all other persons employed by the government, by public enterprises or 
by autonomous public institutions, who should benefit from the guarantees provided for in the 
Convention.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 200. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 98, Costa Rica, 2002. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Nicaragua, 2001. 
The ILO Committee of Experts has explained that the grounds upon which a strike can be called should 
not be limited too narrowly: “organizations responsible for defending workers’ socio-economic and 
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Yet Central American labor laws can make it nearly impossible for workers to 
exercise their right to strike legally. 
• In Costa Rica, subsection (c) of section 373 of the Labor Code requires at least 60 
per cent of the persons who work in the enterprise, workplace or commerce in 
question to approve a strike in order for it to be legal. In 50 years only two strikes 
have been declared legal. The ILO has criticized this requirement. 
• In El Salvador, 51% of all workers in an enterprise must support strike, including 
those workers not represented by the union. Workers can only strike for the 
change or renewal of a collective bargaining agreement or to protect professional 
interests. The collective bargaining agreement must expire and the union must 
mediate and arbitrate disputes before it can call a legal strike. 
• In Guatemala, 50 percent plus one of the workers employed in the enterprise, 
excluding trusted workers and workers representing the employer, are required to 
call a legal strike. This provision has been criticized by the ILO. 
• There are also severe penalties for striking workers in Guatemala. Section 390(2) 
of the Penal Code imposes a penalty of imprisonment of 1 - 5 years for anyone 
engaged in acts for the purpose of paralyzing or disrupting the running of 
enterprises which contribute to the economic development of the country with the 
intention of causing damage to national production. Other changes to ease 
penalties for unlawful strikes have been made to the labor code, but this section 
remains. In addition, section 379 imposes liability on individual workers for legal 
damages resulting from a strike or other collective action, creating a chilling 
effect. The right to strike in the rural sector could be undercut by the power of the 
executive to proscribe work stoppages which seriously affected the economic 
activities essential to the nation. The ILO has criticized a number of these 
provisions as restrictions on workers’ right to strike. 
occupational interests should, in principle, be able to use strike action to support their position in the search 
for solutions to problems posed by major social and economic policy trends which have a direct impact on 
their members and on workers in general, in particular as regards employment, social protection and the 
standard of living.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 165. The ILO Committee of Experts also discusses 
strike votes required by law: “the ballot method, the quorum and the majority required should not be such 
that the exercise of the right to strike becomes very difficult, or even impossible in practice.” And goes on 
to specify, “If a member State deems it appropriate to establish in its legislation provisions which require a 
vote by workers before a strike can be held, it should ensure that account is taken only of the votes cast, and 
that the required quorum and majority are fixed at a reasonable level.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 
170. Mediation and arbitration requirements can also impermissibly restrict the right to strike: “Such 
machinery [requiring exhaustion of mediation and arbitration procedures before a strike can be called] 
must, however, have the sole purpose of facilitating bargaining: it should not be so complex or slow that a 
lawful strike becomes impossible in practice or loses its effectiveness.” Committee of Experts Report, para. 
171. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Costa Rica, 2001. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Guatemala, 2002. 
ILCCR, Examination of individual case concerning Convention No. 87, Guatemala, 2002; and ILO 
CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Guatemala, 2002. 
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• In Honduras, a two-thirds majority of the votes of the total membership of the 
trade union organization is required in order to call a strike (sections 495 and 
563). The ILO has criticized this provision of Honduran law. 
• In Nicaragua, the process for calling a legal strike is lengthy and difficult: all 
workers must vote on the strike action, unions must negotiate with management, 
and the Labor Minister must approve before a union can call a strike. In addition, 
Sections 389 and 390 of the Labor Code allow a labor dispute to be submitted to 
compulsory arbitration when 30 days have elapsed from the calling of the strike. 
There have only been three legal strikes since 1996. The ILO has recommended 
reforming some of these provisions. 
There are even more restrictions on public employees’ right to strike. Restrictions on 
the right to strike in the public sector must be limited to those workers engaged in 
providing “essential services,” which the ILO has consistently defined narrowly. 
• In Costa Rica, strikes are only allowed in the public sector if a judge finds that the 
public service concerned is not an essential service, but there are no clear criteria 
on what constitutes an essential service. 
• In Guatemala, the recent Labor Code reform gives the President broad discretion 
to define an “essential service.” Compulsory arbitration can be imposed in 
Guatemala without the possibility of resorting to a strike in non-essential public 
services such as public health, transport and energy provision. The ILO has 
criticized these provisions. 
• In Honduras, any suspension or stoppage of work in public services that do not 
depend directly or indirectly on the State require government authorization or a 
six-month period of notice (section 558). The Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security can end disputes in the petroleum production, refining, transport and 
distribution services (section 555(2)). Collective disputes in non-essential public 
services must be submitted to compulsory arbitration, without the possibility of 
calling a strike for as long as the arbitration award is in force (two years) (sections 
554(2) and (7), 820 and 826). The ILO has criticized a number of these 
provisions. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Honduras, 2002. 
ILO CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Nicaragua, 2001. 
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B. Central American Governments Fail to Enforce their Labor Laws Effectivel 
1. Failure of Labor Inspectors and Labor Courts to Enforce Labor Laws 
Effectively 
Labor inspectors frequently fail to follow proper procedures through out the Central 
American region. In El Salvador, inspection visits “must occur with the participation of 
the employer, workers, or their representatives." The inspector must meet with both 
parties before preparing a legal document—an Acta—at the conclusion of the inspection, 
and must share the document with the parties. But inspectors frequently fail to follow 
these procedures. 
In El Salvador and Honduras, inspectors fail to interview workers, basing their 
findings solely on employer testimony and potentially flawed company records. In one 
case in El Salvador, inspectors investigating a company’s failure to pay legally-mandated 
bonuses did not contact the union representative who submitted the inspection request or 
’ 55 
the workers lawyer and interviewed no workers. In Honduras, labor inspectors 
investigating the firing of 19 workers conducted their inspection without talking to the 
affected workers. In addition, workers may be denied copies of the inspection results. 
In a number of cases, Labor Ministry personnel participate in employer abuses of 
workers’ rights and labor law violations by honoring illegal employer requests that harm 
workers. In El Salvador, Human Rights Watch found that the Labor Ministry illegally 
required workers to sign resignation letters drafted by the employers in exchange for their 
severance pay. In Honduras, the Ministry granted legal recognition to a company union 
without the signatures of the workers. In Nicaragua, the Ministry authorized the firing 
60 
of union leaders at a maquiladora after the company threatened to leave the country. 
Labor Ministry officials frequently use obstructionist tactics to avoid granting 
recognition to unions. In the case of one private company in El Salvador, the Ministry 
denied recognition based on several workers’ confessions that they did not attend the 
union’s founding assembly, though union leaders allege the confessions were coerced. 
The Ministry also accepted employer assertions that a worker was no longer with the 
company, though union leaders claim the worker was on maternity leave. 
Throughout the region, delays in labor court proceedings and non-enforcement of 
court orders result in the effective denial of justice to workers seeking to exercise 
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54
 Human Rights Watch, Comments Concerning El Salvador’s Failure to Protect Workers’ Human Rights. 
55
 Id. 
56
 See case of La Mesa plantation, Honduras, infra. 
57
 See case of Anthony Fashion, El Salvador, infra. 
58
 Human Rights Watch, Comments Concerning El Salvador’s Failure to Protect Workers’ Human Rights. 
59
 See case of Corazon, Honduras, infra. 
60
 See case of Presitex, Nicaragua, infra 
61
 See cases of the Ministry of Finance, Guatemala, and Corazon, Honduras, infra. 
62
 Human Rights Watch, Comments Concerning El Salvador’s Failure to Protect Workers’ Human Rights. 
15 
freedom of association. In El Salvador, court cases last at least one and a half years if all 
rights of appeal are exhausted and include procedural requirements that may prove 
prohibitively burdensome for workers seeking justice for human rights violations.63 In 
many cases, employers disregard court orders, including orders to reinstate workers who 
have been illegally fired for union activity.64 Sometimes no legal mechanism exists to 
reach an overseas owner. For example, over 350 cases have been filed in San Salvador’s 
labor courts against a private company that reportedly closed without paying workers 
severance pay, annual bonuses, and other debts. The owner has reportedly fled, and the 
cases are stalled and will soon be dismissed without prejudice. Unlike civil and 
commercial cases, there is no legal provision allowing the appointment of a curator ad 
litem to represent absent employers in labor law proceedings.65 
2. Other Enforcement Mechanisms are Inadequate 
In addition to labor inspectors and labor courts, Central American countries have 
experimented with other approaches to enforcing worker rights. 
Several countries have laws that allow governments to suspend or revoke the export 
license of a free trade zone employer that fails to respect worker rights. Such provisions 
can help to put pressure on employers to respect the law, but governments have failed to 
use them strategically as a tool to pressure employers to respect worker rights while 
maintaining production. 
Governments have also tried to establish different types of special investigative or 
prosecutorial units to deal with labor cases. In El Salvador, the Human Rights Procurator 
devotes considerable attention to investigating and issuing public reports on cases of 
worker rights violations. El Salvador’s Labor Ministry also briefly experimented with 
having a special unit for monitoring and analysis of labor relations, focusing on 
conditions in the free trade zones; however, this unit was shut down after a report on 
widespread worker rights violations became public. In Guatemala, the Attorney General 
has created a special unit to prosecute labor crimes, but of the eighty cases investigated so 
far, only one has resulted in an arrest. 
C. Importance of International Mechanisms to Protect Workers’ Rights 
Both the weakness of labor laws and the complete lack of political will among 
Central American governments to enforce or improve those laws has forced workers in 
Central America to turn to international mechanisms to enforce their rights. The 
combination of international pressure and external financial support has, in some cases, 
led to limited improvements in workers’ rights in Central America. But none of these 
63
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instruments can substitute for a motivated, honest commitment on the part of Central 
American governments to guarantee workers’ fundamental rights. 
Mechanisms to promote corporate social responsibility have had some positive 
impact on workers’ rights in the region. A number of apparel companies have instituted 
codes of conduct, backed up by systems to monitor compliance. While some of these 
monitoring systems fail to disclose production facilities or omit fundamental rights such 
as freedom of association, in other cases corporations have played an important role in 
resolving workers’ rights violations. For example, the GAP was instrumental in 
persuading Tainan Enterprises to finance the re-opening of a factory in El Salvador in 
cooperation with the union representing former Tainan workers. 
Financial and technical assistance has also been used to try to improve workers’ 
rights in the region. The U.S. government has provided millions of dollars to Central 
American governments over the past several years, both directly and through the ILO, for 
programs focusing on “labor market modernization” and strengthening labor ministries in 
areas such as child labor, safety and health, alternative dispute resolution, and social 
dialogue. Other donors, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the 
governments of Spain and Norway, have supported similar programs. Yet the reports of 
the ILO and other observers indicate that these programs have done little to address the 
systemic problems of impunity, corruption, and inefficiency in labor administration. One 
explanation for this failure is that very little of this technical assistance has focused on 
strengthening the capacity of unions themselves to defend worker rights, improve living 
standards, and contribute to increasing productivity and economic modernization. A 
serious and systematic effort is needed to increase the capacity of unions, as well as 
employers and government. 
Neither corporate pressure nor technical and financial assistance can by themselves 
create the political will needed to transform the current climate of impunity into one 
favorable to the exercise of core worker rights. The threat of the withdrawal of trade 
sanctions, on the other hand, can create a powerful incentive for Central American 
governments to change their behavior. Recognizing this, Central American unions have 
turned repeatedly to the labor rights language of the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative to bring international attention to worker rights 
violations and to pressure governments to take labor law reform and enforcement 
seriously. In fact, Central America has been the subject of more GSP petitions on 
workers’ rights grounds than almost any other region in the world. 
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These instruments have produced important, but limited, results. While threats to 
trade benefits can motivate Central American governments to make important changes, 
the failure of the U.S. government to consistently and effectively use this tool has 
allowed a number of Central American governments to make only token gestures in order 
to maintain trade benefits. In El Salvador, a GSP case provided the impetus for labor law 
reform in the mid-1990s. In Guatemala, pressure from USTR was instrumental in 
achieving a partial labor law reform and in bringing the perpetrators of an attack on 
leaders of the SITRABI banana union to trial. Unfortunately, the perpetrators of the anti-
union violence were released after paying fines, while five leaders of the union were 
forced to seek asylum in the U.S. 
If respect for workers’ rights is to become a reality in Central America, the actors – 
workers and unions, employers, and governments, must have the capacity, the resources, 
and the will to change. Externally generated trade and investment incentives have had 
some effect on the willingness of employers and governments to take worker rights 
seriously, but must be more effectively used in the future. The introduction of a 
comprehensive system of monitoring by the ILO, backed up by obligations to meet the 
core labor standards that can be enforced through the withdrawal of trade benefits, could 
collectively reward producers and governments for taking a positive approach to worker 
rights. This type of approach, based on a successful experience of monitoring by the ILO 
in Cambodia, could be instrumental in creating the political will to bring labor laws into 
compliance with international norms and to effectively enforce those laws throughout 
Central America.67 
III. COSTA RICA 
A. Denial of Freedom of Association 
Although Costa Rican law specifies the right of workers to join unions, barriers exist 
in practice. Almost all unionized workers are in the public sector; very few workers in 
the private sector belong to unions. One of the main impediments to freedom of 
association in Costa Rica is the government’s tolerance of employer-promoted solidarity 
associations. In 1991, the ILO ruled that these solidarity associations were interfering in 
trade union activities and violating the freedom of association in Costa Rica. In 1993, 
Costa Rica responded by enacting new legislation (Law 7360) that restricts the 
associations’ activities and prohibits the associations from signing collective bargaining 
agreements. In 1998, a tripartite agreement included a commitment by the government to 
enact a series of legal reforms to guarantee freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.68 This commitment was reaffirmed in an agreement signed 23 November 
1999 between the government and unions.69 Despite these undertakings, proposed labor 
See Sandra Polaski, Central America and the U.S. Face Challenge—and Chance for 
Historic 
Breakthrough—on Workers’ Rights (February 2003), available at www.ceip.org. 
Consejo Superior de Trabajo, Comision Ad Hoc de la Concertacion. Informe Concertado “Libertad 
Sindical, ” 5 October 1998. 
Acta Acuerdo, 23 de noviembre de 1999, entre Jefes de Fracciones Legislativas Mayoritarias, Ministro 
de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y organizaciones sindicales, acuerdos 8, 10 y 11. 
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legislation that would protect freedom of association has not been approved.70 In 
addition, a series of executive and judicial decisions have further restricted the already 
narrow scope of collective bargaining rights in the public sector, and the laws that protect 
freedom of association have not been effectively enforced.71 
Under Costa Rican law, union leaders are protected against retaliatory dismissal on 
account of their union activities by a special immunity, known as fuero sindical.72 There 
are serious problems with this immunity. First, the protection applies only to a small 
number of union leaders and for a limited period of time (the specifics are spelled out in 
Article 367 of the Labor Code). These restrictions have been criticized by the ILO.73 
Second, the courts have systematically refused to recognize a Constitutional cause of 
action for dismissal of union leaders, relegating these cases to the labor courts (where, 
despite a legal requirement that cases be adjudicated within 2 months, the average time to 
resolve a case is three years).74 Third, in the case of fuero sindical, unlike all other 
Constitutionally-established immunities, the employer is not required to establish just 
cause prior to effecting the dismissal. Finally, for union leaders in the private sector, 
there is no legal mechanism to reinstate union leaders even if their dismissal is found to 
be unjust.75 In 1998, the government submitted draft legislation, negotiated through a 
tripartite process, that would have addressed many of these problems, but this legislation 
has never been approved.76 
The lack of effective remedies for anti-union retaliation helps to create a climate of 
impunity where employers feel free to dismiss union organizers and leaders and to 
replace them with company-controlled unions or direct dealing with employees, with 
little fear of legal consequences. This impunity is most pronounced in the private sector, 
where mass dismissals of union members are common. For example, at Agropecuaria 
Matina, S.A., which is owned by the Costa Rican Ambassador to the United Kingdom, a 
number of workers were dismissed in February 2001 and then rehired under worse 
conditions. 
As a result of this impunity, union representation has been almost eliminated in the 
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private sector in Costa Rica. The most recent data indicate that while 11.99% of all 
workers are unionized, only 5.24% of private sector workers (59,432 workers) are 
represented by unions. However, if members of unions of small agricultural producers, 
where no labor-management relation exists, are excluded, the actual number of private 
sector union members is only 25,999, representing only 2.29% of private sector workers. 
In contrast, 53.04% of public sector workers have union representation (98,697 
workers). 
The ICFTU has expressed specific concerns about conditions in Costa Rica’s nine 
Export Processing Zones, where large numbers of workers have been dismissed on 
account of union involvement. Most of these cases are decided in favor of the employer, 
and in the few cases where workers have prevailed, the decisions were subsequently 
overturned. Costa Rican law (Article 60(2) of the Constitution and Section 345(e) of the 
Labor Code) prohibits workers who are not Costa Rican nationals from holding trade 
union office, effectively excluding more than 300,000 immigrant workers from 
participation in union leadership. Despite repeated ILO criticisms of this provision, draft 
legislation to repeal these provisions has lain dormant in the Parliament for more than 
five years. In addition, agricultural workers in small enterprises (those which 
permanently employ no more than five workers) are excluded from union representation 
under section 14 (c) of the Labor Code. This provision was held unconstitutional in 
1952, but the constitutional change has never been reflected in the Labor Code. 
B. Denial of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively in the Private Sector 
In addition to the restrictions on union organizing and representation in the private 
sector discussed above, the government has fostered and promoted specific mechanisms 
to undermine collective bargaining. 
The labor code explicitly permits direct dealing between employers and employees 
over terms and conditions of employment. It also permits the formation of “Permanent 
Workers’ Committees” of up to three members in each workplace, which are authorized 
to present complaints or requests on behalf of the workforce. Whereas unions are subject 
to a number of onerous and illegal requirements, e.g the requirement that all members of 
their governing councils be Costa Rican citizens, no such requirements apply to the 
Permanent Workers’ Committees. In practice, these committees are effectively 
controlled by employers. 
The government also continues to encourage the formation of Solidarista 
associations, under the 1984 Ley de Asociaciones Solidaristas. Despite being explicitly 
prohibited from collective bargaining (under Law 7360), these associations have 
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increasingly taken over functions that properly belong to unions. As a result, between 
1994 and 1999, 479 direct arrangements (arreglos directos) between employers and 
workers were registered in the private sector and only 31 collective bargaining 
agreements (convenciones). Of these 31, only 13 remain in force today; all of these are 
enterprise-level contracts. 
The banana plantations of Costa Rica are known as the birthplace of the solidarismo 
movement. Companies promote the solidarity associations as a means of undermining 
and displacing the unions. Employer efforts to lower working standards and violate 
workers’ rights have increased in recent years as a result of great international 
commercial pressure. Competition among the banana exporting companies for access to 
the European market has stimulated regional overproduction, provoking a “race to the 
bottom” that threatens decent wages and working conditions in the historically unionized 
Central American and Colombian banana plantations. 
1. COBASUR 
In 1998, the banana company COBASUR denied recognition of the Union of 
Workers of the South (SITRASUR), refused to deduct union dues for union members, 
fired the union’s general secretary, and established a solidarity association with which it 
initiated negotiations. The labor inspector confirmed the allegations and lodged a 
complaint against COBASUR in the labor courts of Costa Rica on November 20, 1998. 
Later, the General Secretary, Adrian Herrera Arias, received death threats, and an attack 
on his vehicle. On April 13, 1999, as the legal process dragged on without result, Mr. 
Herrera Arias was brutally beaten and threatened with death. 
On April 27, 1999, the ICFTU filed a complaint against Costa Rica with the ILO. 
The ILO’s report deeply regretted the company’s anti-union discrimination and 
interference and requested the government to keep it informed of the legal process. The 
Committee also requested that the government take measures to ensure that COBASUR 
properly deduct the dues of SITRASUR affiliates as provided by law. After three years, 
the case was settled as a result of the ILO complaint. 
2. Empresa Mercantil 
A case reported since the filing of the AFL-CIO GSP petition concerns the Empresa 
Auto Mercantil S.A. On September 14, 2001 the union presented a demand to the Labor 
Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit regarding labor conditions in the enterprise. The 
union nominated members to represent it before the court. Despite the Labor Code 
provision that no worker can be dismissed once a case is presented without prior approval 
83
 Data from Departamento de Relaciones de Trabajo, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. 
84
 See generally ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No. 1984, concerning numerous worker 
rights violations on Costa Rican banana plantations, which is discussed in Reports Nos. 316 (1999), 320 
(2000), and 324 (2001). 
85
 ICFTU Report at 4. 
86
 Information in this section from ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 320, Case No. 
2024 (2000). 
21 
from a court, the company immediately fired the three representatives. According to the 
Labor Code, once a collective conflict is presented to the judge, a conciliation tribunal 
must be constituted within 12 hours including the judge and a representative of the 
employer and the union. This was never done. Nor has the union’s petition to nullify the 
illegal dismissals been acted on. The Union has requested an embargo on the firm’s 
property, but no judicial action has resulted despite the threat that the enterprise will be 
sold. 
3. Carrandi 
Another recent case concerns the Empresa Bananera Carrandi S.A. On September 2, 
2002, the Union of Workers of Agricultural Plantations (SITRAP) notified the company 
that seven workers had joined the union. At 5 a.m. the next day, the administrator of the 
plantation called the workers to his office and interrogated them, promised to resolve 
their concerns, and told them he had forms for disaffiliating. The same day a solidarista 
promoter from the John XXIII School appeared, warning that the union collected 10% of 
salaries as dues and offering disaffiliation forms. The next day the union members held a 
meeting. The following day the administrator convened them and warned that no 
meetings were allowed on the plantation.87 
On September 6 the administrator broke up a meeting between workers and a 
SITRAP official, and ordered the official off the plantation (contrary to law). When the 
SITRAP official attempted to leave, he found the gate locked and guarded by armed men, 
who interrogated him before allowing him to leave. On September 9 the union informed 
the company that another 6 workers had joined. The new members again asked the union 
representative to attend a meeting, and the representative informed the administrator’s 
secretary. Again the administrator broke up the meeting and ordered the union 
representative to leave. The union is currently awaiting a report from the Labor 
Inspectorate, but expects that it will not receive a court decision for 3 to 4 years, during 
which time it has no remedy for the employer’s unlawful behavior. 
4. Caribana 
Banana workers in Caribana, Lomas de Sarapiquí, attempted to organize in the 
SITAGAH union beginning in August, 2002 to protest non-payment of wages and lack of 
safety and health protections.. Management has interfered directly in the process of 
naming union representatives, threatening retaliation against any workers who attempt to 
complain. The John XXIII School has assisted management in these actions; the Labor 
Ministry has not intervened to protect workers’ rights to choose their representatives. In 
addition, the employer has retaliated against pro-union employees by reducing their 
wages by as much as 50 per cent. In practice, the union is not allowed to carry out its 
representative functions.88 
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5. Sixaola 
Another banana producer, Sixaola S.A. (a subsidiary of CORBANA) has committed 
numerous labor rights violations. Sixaola has refused to negotiate with the Union of 
Agricultural Workers of Limon (UTRAL), preferring to deal directly with the Permanent 
Workers’ Committee. In addition, the employer undermines the union by hiring 
temporary employees. As a result, the working day has been extended while wage 
increases decreed over the past three years have not been paid to the workers.89 
C. Denial of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively in the Public Sector 
The government severely restricts collective bargaining in the public sector in a 
number of ways. First, the great majority of public employees are prohibited from 
negotiating collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas). Most public 
employees are forced to use the Regulation on Collective Bargaining for Public Servants, 
which fails to meet minimum ILO requirements for public sector bargaining; even the 
minimal requirements of this Regulation are routinely violated by the government. 
Likewise, in those few workplaces where convenciones colectivas are legal, the 
government has refused to negotiate under these agreements. In addition, in workplaces 
where previously existing convenciones colectivas have been held to be valid, the 
government has eliminated the collective bargaining language from these agreements. 
Finally, the right to bargain over wages is denied to practically all public employees. 
Despite many promises to do so, the government has not enacted legislation to address 
these defects. The ILO has repeatedly criticized Costa Rica’s failure to make progress on 
this legislation.90 
The government has consistently interpreted the 1979 General Law on Public 
Administration to prohibit the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements for public 
employees with the general exception of local governments and universities91, and 
collective bargaining agreements existing prior to 26 April 1979.92 Specifically, the 
ruling has been interpreted to hold that only employees of entities whose activities are 
governed by common law may negotiate collective bargaining agreements. Examples of 
workers who do not have the right to bargain include cooks in school cafeterias, garbage 
collectors, highway maintenance workers, and musicians in the National Symphony 
Orchestra. 
Attempts to resolve public sector labor disputes through the arbitration procedures 
established in Article 526 of the Labor Code were also held unconstitutional in 1992.93 In 
the bipartite agreement signed by the government and trade unions on 22 October 1992, 
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the government promised that it would regulate collective bargaining, dispute resolution, 
and strikes in the public sector by means of a Public Employment Law. As a provisional 
measure, the government promulgated the Regulation on Collective Bargaining for 
Public Servants. But the promised Public Employment Law has never been enacted, and 
the gravely deficient provisional regulation remains in place. 
The Regulation on its face violates the right of collective bargaining. Specifically, 
the ILO has found that the Regulation’s requirement that all collective agreements be 
reviewed by a commission of state officials, with the authority to reject the negotiated 
agreement, is “contrary to the principles of collective negotiation.” Moreover, the 
Regulation sweepingly excludes any negotiation of salaries or any issue with potential 
impact on the national budget. A proposed new regulation, presented by the government 
in May 2001, fails to remedy these deficiencies. 
Yet the government has failed to give effect to even this flawed provisional 
regulation, refusing to approve agreements negotiated under the Regulation (for example, 
agreements between the National Registry and SITRARENA, between the Institute for 
Agrarian Development (IDA) and UNEIDA, and between the National System of Radio 
and Television (SINART) and ANEP). In other cases, government agencies have simply 
refused to bargain over negotiating proposals made under the regulation (for example, the 
Colegio Universitario de Puntarenas and the Instituto Costarricense de Deporte.) 
With a few narrow exceptions, bargaining over wages has been relegated to the 
“Negotiating Commission on Public Sector Salaries” made up of government and trade 
union representatives. However, the government has failed to implement agreements that 
have been reached in this Commission. For example, in 1995 the government signed an 
agreement authorizing a wage increase of 4,000 colones, to be followed by a second 
increase amounting to an 11.49% increase. When the unions challenged the 
government’s failure to implement the second increase, the Supreme Court held that an 
agreement reached in the Negotiating Commission on Public Sector Salaries is binding 
only when the government issues a decree implementing the agreement. The 
government’s subsequent practice has shown that it will give no independent effect to 
agreements negotiated in the Commission. 
Even in the few public entities where collective bargaining is still permitted, such as 
the National Insurance Institute and the Postal Service, the government has refused to 
negotiate over proposals presented by the unions. And in public entities where collective 
bargaining agreements existed prior to 1979, the courts have proceeded to declare 
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collective bargaining clauses unconstitutional on a case-by-case basis. Examples include 
the case of RECOPE and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. 
1. SITRARENA 
In 1995, after negotiations and a series of strikes, an “agreement” was signed between 
the Trade Union of Workers and Retired Workers of the National Registry and Related 
Persons (SITRARENA) and the administration of the National Registry, which is a part 
of the Ministry of Justice. This agreement was the only one that has been achieved under 
the provisional regulation that permits a weak form of collective bargaining in the public 
sector. 
The agreement reached between SITRARENA and the National Registry was 
submitted to the Ministry of Labor in August of 1995. However, the Ministry of Labor 
never convened the required commission of state officials, and the agreement languished. 
On July 24, 1998, the Legal Affairs Board of the Ministry of Labor opined that the 
agreement should be considered approved, given that the two month time limit for a 
decision had expired almost three years earlier. However, on September 1, 1998, the 
Constitutional Court denied the union’s application for a court order to enforce the 
agreement, holding that the proper procedures had not been followed and the union’s 
rights had not been infringed by the non-application of the agreement. In 1999, the 
Ministry of Justice issued circulars declaring the National Registry’s agreement with the 
union to be technically flawed and impossible to apply. To date, the original agreement 
has not been implemented. 
The Rerum Novarum Confederation of Workers (CTRN) and SITRARENA filed a 
complaint before the ILO in May 1999. The Committee on Freedom of Association found 
in 2000 that the regulation is contrary to the principles of collective bargaining under 
Convention No. 98. 
Noting that in its response the government had stressed that a new bill on public 
employment which would improve the opportunities for bargaining in the public sector is 
pending in the Legislative Assembly, the ILO Committee urged the government to adopt 
the new law as soon as possible. The Committee also offered technical assistance in 
drafting the legislation to be in conformance with ILO Conventions. 
The government of Costa Rica declined the offered technical assistance. The 
government has also failed to enact the new legislation, despite its communication to the 
ILO and despite the ILO’s conclusion that the current regulations violate the 
internationally recognized right to collective bargaining. 
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2. SEBANA 
The Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica (SEBANA) is also 
facing barriers to collective bargaining. Prior to the 1992 legislation, SEBANA had 
already achieved an agreement with the National Bank of Costa Rica. However, 
SEBANA and the Bank were unable to agree on proposed reforms to the agreement. The 
particular area of dispute concerns retirement packages to employees with more than 25 
years of continuous service. 
The dispute was presented to the magistrates of the Court of Cassation, which is part 
of the Supreme Court of Justice and handles cases of labor law. On August 11, 1999, the 
Court ruled that it had profound doubts about the legality of reforming existing collective 
agreements in the public sector and therefore the Court would consult with the 
Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of such reforms given that the 
Constitution does not recognize this type of collective agreement. 
The case is currently pending in the Constitutional Court. This case represents a huge 
threat to trade unions and the rule of law in Costa Rica. Costa Rica has not only enacted 
legislation that severely impedes the right to form any new agreements; now the right of 
even existing agreements to continue to be legally recognized is threatened. 
D. Privatization Undermines Public Employees’ Right to Organize and Bargain 
Collectively 
The International Monetary Fund has pressed Costa Rica for structural reforms, 
particularly the privatization of the electrical sector and other state-owned enterprises and 
pension reform. This pressure has provoked widespread public opposition.101 Workers 
are particularly alarmed due to the government’s antipathy toward trade unions and the 
failure to include unions in the process of privatization. 
In March 20, 2000, the Legislative Assembly adopted a bill to privatize the public 
services in the electricity and telecommunications sectors. Opposition was fierce and led 
to large demonstrations. The government reacted by deploying riot police, who were 
accused of using excessive force (firearms, batons and tear gas) and arbitrary arrests. 
1. FERTICA102 
100
 Information in this section from the Rerum Novarum Confederation of Workers. 
101
 In recent discussions between IMF staff and the government of Costa Rica, “staff urged the authorities 
to takes steps to allow for greater participation of the private sector in these key areas, including through 
the privatization of public enterprises. The authorities stressed the strong public support for public 
enterprises, which were perceived as generally efficient and able to satisfy the needs of the growing 
economy. In their view, it would be unrealistic to expect the Assembly to approve legislation allowing the 
privatization of public enterprises in the period ahead.” International Monetary Fund, Costa Rica: Staff 
Report for the 2002 Consultation with Costa Rica (February 7, 2003), p. 12. 
102
 Information in this section from ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 311, Case No. 
1966 (1998). 
26 
In 1995, the national fertilizer company, FERTICA, was privatized. Shortly 
thereafter, the company fired 20 workers in violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement that had existed with the Association of Fertilizer Workers (ATFe) since 1970. 
The union complained that the dismissals were in violation of the agreement, and the 
company quickly fired them also. In September of 1999, the company simply fired all 
265 employees and rehired them on contracts whose conditions were substantially 
inferior to the collective agreement. In place of ATFe, the company established the 
Solidarity Association of FERTICA. 
ATFe attempted to use administrative measures, legal actions and a petition to the 
ILO. First, ATFe approached the Ministry of Labor. However, the Ministry stalled for 
so long after the inspection that it decided the time for action had expired. ATFe then 
approached the Constitutional Court, which denied its petitions. The Court delayed even 
longer than the Ministry of Labor, delivering its final decision in 1999. ATFE also 
presented legal petitions before the Labor Court and initiated a process that took more 
than four years without result. 
In 1996, ATFe filed a complaint before the ILO. The Committee on Freedom of 
Association deplored the unfair labor practices and the dilatoriness of the government in 
addressing these practices. The Committee requested that the government take measures 
to mediate the dispute between the parties, while respecting the right to bargain 
collectively and to reinstate the dismissed workers. The Committee requested that the 
workers dismissed for their trade union affiliation be reinstated and that the collective 
agreement be implemented. 
The government failed to implement its recommendations. None of the executive 
board of ATFe or the 265 members was reinstated, the collective bargaining agreement 
was not implemented. Furthermore, the company engaged in more anti-union practices 
that were verified by the Labor Inspector but were not addressed or resolved by the 
government. These included blocking ATFe’s attempts to communicate with its 
members, refusing to recognize the ATFe board, establishing a parallel board, refusing to 
turn over to the union dues that the company had deducted from union members; and 
refusing to participate in collective bargaining. As a result, ATFe filed another complaint 
with the ILO in 1998. In response to that complaint, the Committee on Freedom of 
Association: 
1) urged the government to take new measures to implement without delay its 
recommendations made regarding the earlier case: to ensure that the dismissed 
employees are reinstated and that the collective bargaining agreement is 
implemented; 
2) expressed concern regarding the government’s slowness, noting that the long 
delay amounts to a denial of justice; 
3) deplored that FERTICA had again engaged in anti-union practices and urged the 
government to take measures to ensure that FERTICA recognize ATFe, turn over 
the withheld dues; and refrain from interference with the union that amounts to 
grave violations of the principle of freedom of association; 
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4) requested that the government ensure that FERTICA honors the collective 
agreement; and 
5) requested that the government take measures to conduct detailed investigations 
into all the allegations against FERTICA and ensure that the judicial orders 
against dismissals be respected. 
As a result of this action the union’s legal case for recovery of dues retained by the 
employer was reinstated; however the court order requiring that the dues be turned over 
to the union has still not been enforced. An attempt by the company union to legally 
dissolve ATFe was also rejected by the courts. However the principal case of illegal 
dismissals, some of which occurred more than five years ago, has still not been resolved. 
E. Denial of the Right to Strike 
The right to strike, a necessary corollary to effective collective bargaining, is 
effectively non-existent in Costa Rica. The law sets out detailed and burdensome 
requirements for demonstrating the legality of a strike, including the presentation by the 
union of a list of striking workers to demonstrate 60% participation, as well as the 
exhaustion of administrative requirements that have taken on average three years to 
complete. As a result, in the fifty years during which to Labor Code has been in effect, 
only two strikes have been held legal. Draft labor reform legislation proposed by the 
government does not remove this requirement, which has been criticized by the ILO. A 
constitutional challenge to the Labor Code provisions governing the declaration of a legal 
strike, brought in July 1999, has been pending before the Constitutional Court which has 
not yet decided if it will even consider the case. 
Strikes remain effectively prohibited in the public sector, in agriculture, and in 
transportation, despite a 1998 ruling by the Supreme Court which declared illegal 
sections 376(a) and (b) of the Labor Code, which respectively prohibited strikes by public 
officials and agricultural workers. The Constitutional Chamber, reviewing this 
decision, held in March 2000 that a judge must first determine that “services necessary to 
the well-being of the public” will not be jeopardized before a public sector strike can 
proceed. However, neither the courts not the legislature have adopted criteria to define 
these services, leaving strike procedures effectively paralyzed for lack of legal 
guidance. In addition, sections 375 and 376(c) of the Labor Code still prohibit the 
exercise of the right to strike in the rail, maritime, and air transport sectors. The ILO has 
expressed strong hope that in the very near future the government will take measures to 
recognize workers’ right to strike in these sectors. 
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F. Child Labor 
The Costa Rican Constitution and Labor Code establish a minimum working age of 
15 years and provides special protections for children between the ages of 15 and 18 
years. Nevertheless, a 1999 study by the Ministry of Labor reported that up to nine 
percent of children between 5 and 14 years of age are working in either the formal or 
informal workforce107, while an IPEC survey indicated that 56,261 children under 14 are 
employed, excluding those working in the informal economy.108 The US State 
Department report that “child labor remains an integral part of the informal economy, 
particularly in small-scale agriculture and family-run microenterprises selling various 
items, which employ a significant proportion of the labor force.109 “An estimated 70,000 
girls and young women, many of whom are Nicaraguan immigrants and some 40% of 
whom started work before age 14, work as domestic servants. 110 
Child prostitution in Costa Rica, much of it linked to sex tourism, has attracted 
increasing attention.111 There are an estimated 3000 child prostitutes in San Jose.112 Child 
advocacy groups have criticized the government for failing to provide the National 
Institute for Children (PANI) with sufficient resources and for inadequate enforcement of 
laws against child prostitution and sex tourism.113 
G. Actions of the Costa Rican Government since June 2001 
The government of Costa Rica claims that it has taken a number of actions to improve 
respect for worker rights. First, the government claims that it has made efforts to respond 
to the ILO technical assistance mission that visited Costa Rica from September 3-7, 2001. 
These actions allegedly include: 
1) Submission of ILO Conventions 151 and 154 for ratification; 
2) Introduction in the Legislative Assembly of a proposed amendment to Article 192 
of the Constitution clarifying the right of collective bargaining in the public 
sector; 
3) Presentation to the Legislative Assembly of a proposed amendment to include 
collective bargaining in the General Act on Public Administration; 
4) Submission to the Legislative Assembly of a draft amendment to the Labor Code 
on freedom of association; and 
5) Improvements in the administration of labor justice. 
Committee requests the Government to provide information in its next report on the measures adopted.” 
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Second, the government purports to have reactivated a process of social dialogue with 
trade unions and employers. As evidence of this reactivation, the government cites: 
1) Bipartite discussions between unions and employers belonging to the Costa Rican 
Union of Chambers and Associations of Private Enterprises (UCCAEP); and 
2) Revival of the Higher Council for Labor; specifically creation of a Commission 
for Labor Reform to evaluate draft legislation, and a National Commission on 
Employment to define the framework of a national employment policy. 
In addition, the government notes the closing of the COBASUR case by the ILO. 
In fact, since June 2001 the Costa Rican government has continued to foster and 
promote actions that undermine freedom of association and collective bargaining. None 
of the serious deficiencies noted by the ILO and described in the AFL-CIO’s 2001 
petition have been remedied. The labor code explicitly permits direct dealing between 
employers and employees over terms and conditions of employment. It permits the 
formation of “Permanent Workers’ Committees,” effectively controlled by employers, 
that are authorized to present complaints or requests on behalf of the workforce. And the 
government continues to encourage the formation of Solidarista associations that, despite 
being explicitly prohibited from collective bargaining, have increasingly taken over 
functions that properly belong to unions. Collective bargaining in the public sector is 
still effectively prohibited for most categories of public employees. 
The government’s recent promises to reform its labor laws echo promises that were 
made - and broken - a decade ago. On October 22,1992 and November 8,1993 the 
government and unions signed agreements providing for reform of labor laws to permit 
collective bargaining in the public sector. The government did not honor these 
agreements, and unions continued to report violations of fundamental rights to the ILO 
and USTR. In 1998, there was another attempt at dialogue resulting in a tripartite 
agreement, under which the government promised to enact a series of reforms governing 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. This commitment was reaffirmed in 
an agreement signed November 23,1999 between the government and unions. The 
government has utterly failed to comply with these commitments or to address in any 
significant way the repeated criticisms of the ILO. 
1. Submission of ILO Conventions 151 and 154 for Ratification 
The government claims that it has submitted ILO Conventions 151 and 154 to the 
legislature for ratification. What it does not say is that the promise to ratify these 
conventions was contained in its agreement with the unions of October 22,1992. Despite 
the ILO Committee of Experts’ expression of “the firm hope that it will be adopted in the 
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very near future," there is no greater likelihood of this law being enacted now than ten 
years ago. In fact, ratification appears less likely: the Technical Services Department of 
the Legislative Assembly has indicated that the current proposal for ratification of ILO 
Conventions 110, 151, and 154 cannot be voted on because they were submitted by a 
deputy and not by the Executive Branch, meaning that the ratification proposal must be 
re-initiated. 
2. Proposed Legislation on Collective Bargaining (amendment to Article 192 of 
the Constitution and amendment to include collective bargaining in the 
General Act on Public Administration) 
The ILO Technical Assistance Mission emphasized “the confusion, uncertainty 
and even legal insecurity that exist with respect to the scope of collective bargaining 
rights in the public sector” and the consequent need to: 
“realize important progress respecting the right of collective bargaining for those 
employees in the public sector who are statutory employees who do not work in 
State administration (including those who work in state enterprises or 
decentralized public institutions, a right which appears to have been negated by 
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice through a retroactive 
decision that also appears to contravene existing collective agreements, numerous 
other collective bargaining instruments that apply to these categories of workers, 
and the constitutionality of the regulation on public sector collective bargaining of 
31 May 2001 . . .The mission expresses its concern regarding the precarious 
situation of collective bargaining in the public sector" 
Yet the Executive’s reform proposals introduced in May 2002 have not advanced, and 
there is nothing to suggest that they will be treated differently than identical proposals 
that the government agreed to ten years ago. 
3. Draft Amendment to the Labor Code on Freedom of Association 
The government also touts its proposed reforms on freedom of association. But in 
fact its draft amendment to the Labor Code unilaterally and significantly weakens the 
reform package that was agreed on by labor, business, and government but never enacted 
- because the government subsequently demanded major concessions on wage flexibility 
in exchange for its support. 
The subject of freedom of association was discussed in the Higher Council of Labor, 
resulting in the “Consensus Report on Freedom of Association” of October 5,1998 
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endorsed by the government, employers, and trade unions.121 This agreement implied 
reforms in areas of freedom of association, public employment, and judicial procedures to 
sanction non-compliance and effectively protect union officers from dismissal. Of the 
various legal reform proposals mandated by the tripartite agreement, the government 
submitted only one to the Legislative Assembly, concerning protection of union officers 
against dismissal and internal organization of unions.122 This bill was debated in the 
Committee on Social Affairs of the Legislative Assembly on February 9,1999 and voted 
out with unanimous support on March 10,1999, and has not moved since. 
The government attempts to create the impression that the proposal is advancing 
in the Legislative Assembly. In fact, the government submitted an entirely different 
proposal linking freedom of association with labor market flexibilization123 as a substitute 
for the reforms agreed upon in a tripartite process. This law unilaterally modifies the 
proposal achieved by tripartite consensus.124 It incorporates proposals for a flexible work 
week, which are still under discussion in the Higher Council of Labor and on which there 
is no consensus among the parties, due to concerns about increased unemployment of 
women, negative effects on workers who are also studying to advance their careers, and 
heightened safety risks. 
4. Alleged Improvements in the Administration of Labor Justice 
The ILO Committee of Experts continues to note the “slowness of judicial procedures 
in the event of cases of anti-union persecution and of those applicable in cases of 
breaches of the labour legislation giving rise to the imposition of penalties which, 
according to the report of the mission, may last for one or two years, as well as, in 
contrast, the government's statement that the prior administrative procedure takes around 
the period of two months established by the Constitutional Chamber.”125 
The government asserts that it has improved prosecution of anti-union acts. But the 
statistics it provides on employment cases lump freedom of association cases together 
with all sorts of individual employment cases, disguising the delays of up to nine years in 
adjudicating freedom of association claims. 
As noted by the Committee of Experts, the duration of administrative procedures has 
been declining, probably as a result of the 2-month limit imposed by the Constitutional 
Chamber. Still, only 29.6% of investigations were completed on time in 1998 and 29.4% 
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in 1999. Moreover, this time limit applies only to the investigation of a complaint. Once 
the investigation is completed it often takes another 3 to 4 years to obtain a decision. 
For example, the Union of Workers of the National Association of Educators Credit 
Union (ANDE) notified the employer of its formation on May 10,1996. On May 24 the 
union leaders were fired. The Labor Inspectorate confirmed the violation on August 
8,1996, but the Constitutional Chamber did not issue a decision until July 2,1998. In the 
case of members of the executive council of the Union of Workers of the Alajuela 
Maquila (SITRAMA) at Wrangler Costa Rica, fired one day after the union was 
organized, it took nine months for the inspection report to be presented to the court. 
The court has still not issued a decision after more than 3 Vi years. 
In addition to delay and inefficiency, the lack of effective remedies makes it 
impossible to obtain compliance with judicial orders. For example, the leaders of the 
workers’ association at the Port of Limon were fired over six years ago. A court ordered 
reinstatement more than three years ago, but the employer has still not complied. 
5. Failure to Reactivate Social Dialogue 
The government purports to have reactivated social dialogue. In fact, the new 
“Commission on Labor Reform” chaired by the Minister of Justice was constituted on 
September 5 but has never been convened despite union requests to do so, apparently 
because the government has not appointed a new Minister. The “National Commission 
on Employment” has never met. The labor-business dialogue involving unions and the 
Costa Rican Union of Chambers and Associations of Private Enterprises (UCCAEP) has 
some union participation, but focuses on employment policy, not worker rights. 
Far from reviving social dialogue, the government - as described above - has 
repeatedly flouted commitments made in tripartite consultations with unions and 
employers, and has broken its promises to the ILO and USTR of substantial reforms to 
improve workers’rights. The systematic and serious violations of fundamental worker 
rights reported in the AFL-CIO’s June 2001 petition continue unabated, as demonstrated 
in the substantial new information presented in this supplement. If the government has 
taken any steps since June 2001, they have been backward. 
IV. EL SALVADOR 
In designating El Salvador as a beneficiary country pursuant to the CBTPA, USTR 
noted “significant concerns” raised during the eligibility review. USTR’s letter to the 
government of El Salvador noted “particular concerns with respect to the effect of 
ongoing economic restructuring programs on the establishment and activities of labor 
unions.” In addition, USTR expressed concern over “[a]n apparent lack of effective 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Dirección Nacional de Inspección , Resolución DNI-429-99, 
23 April 1999. 
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enforcement of labor rights and labor code requirements in El Salvador’s export 
processing zones.” 127 
As noted by the AFL-CIO and other organizations in GSP petitions field in 2000 and 
again in 2002, the government of El Salvador has failed to take steps to address its 
systematic failure to protect freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, 
including the concerns raised by USTR. The government has: 
• Provided no remedies for repeated acts of anti-union discrimination, retaliatory 
firings, and illegal lockouts of union activists in the maquilas; and 
• Allowed public sector agencies to undermine unions - in some cases taking 
advantage of public restructuring and privatization plans to do so - by refusing to 
recognize a legitimate union, pressuring workers to disaffiliate from their union, 
breaking up union meetings, targeting union activists for suspension, and illegally 
locking out union members by forcibly evicting them from the workplace. 
• Failed to remedy and even denied serious health and safety lapses in the 
maquiladoras producing for export; 
Through delays, refusals to provide effective remedies, and active animosity the 
government has directly aided private exporters in denying their workers freedom of 
association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. The government has also 
directly violated public sector workers’ rights, thus dragging down standards for all 
Salvadoran workers and the Salvadoran labor market as a whole. All of these actions 
provide ample evidence that the government has not been and is not taking steps to afford 
its workers their internationally recognized worker rights. 
A. Labor Laws and Enforcement Mechanisms are Inadequate to Protect 
Fundamental Workers’ Rights 
A recent investigation by Human Rights Watch underscores the deficiencies of both 
the Salvadoran legal regime for protection of workers’ rights, and the administrative and 
judicial mechanisms for enforcing these laws. The HRW investigation, based on 
extensive field research, draws attention to structural deficiencies in labor laws, 
including: weak protections against anti-union suspensions and dismissals; no explicit 
protection against anti-union discrimination in hiring; obstacles to union registration; and 
suspensions to circumvent labor law protections. 
The Human Rights Watch report also documents the systemic failure of the 
Salvadoran Labor Ministry and judicial system to enforce national laws and regulations 
that protect workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The 
report shows that labor inspectors often fail to follow proper procedures, especially 
preparation of an Acta (record) of an inspection visit. Workers are frequently denied the 
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opportunity to participate in inspection visits, and sometimes inspectors refuse to provide 
workers and union representatives with copies of actas as legally required. The Labor 
Ministry generally is derelict in enforcing inspection orders and exercising its power to 
impose sanctions on employers, and often refuses to rule on matters within its 
jurisdiction. In some cases, labor inspectors openly tolerate or participate in illegal 
actions by employers such as coercing employees to sign resignation letters. In addition, 
the Labor Ministry erects obstacles to unions’ legal registration. 
Labor courts are characterized by delays and burdensome procedural requirements 
that inflict heavy costs on workers and often prevent them from seeking justice. 
Witnesses are not protected against employer retaliation. There are no procedures to 
obtain jurisdiction over employers who fail to appear in court. Even when a judgment is 
obtained, it is often impossible to enforce it. Employers - including the government -
frequently disregard court orders to reinstate fired workers with no legal consequence.. 
B. Denial of Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize and Bargain 
Collectively in the Private Sector 
The government of El Salvador continues to tolerate worker rights violations in El 
Salvador’s maquiladoras that produce apparel for export, principally to the US. The 
government’s response to media reports of massive safety and health violations in the 
maquilas has been either to deny the existence of a problem or to blame the unions. In 
September 2002, the media reported a massive chemical intoxication that affected 500 
workers, the majority of them women, in the Olocuilta free trade zone. The workers were 
evacuated from several factories and received medical attention for symptoms of 
chemical intoxication. Hoon’s Apparel, one such factory where the poisoning occurred, 
had had a similar case of intoxication in July 2002. Backed by the government, factory 
owners, with no investigation, attributed the intoxication to “mass hysteria,” asserting 
that there were no toxic chemicals present in their factories. 
After the Red Cross and public hospitals confirmed the presence of toxins in the 
workers, factory owners along with President Flores and the Comité de Emergencia 
Nacional (COEN) began accusing “groups whose interests lie in attacking maquilas” for 
the “acts of terrorism and sabotage.” Local, US and international union leaders were 
blamed for the intoxication. In contrast, the report of the government’s Human Rights 
Procurator found that the intoxication reflected a failure on the part of the government to 
provide adequate workplace safety and health protections. The report specifically 
condemned the “grave irresponsibility” of government leaders including the Labor 
Minister and the Chief of the National Police who “rather than providing adequate 
information about what had happened, sowed confusion among the population by 
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circulating irresponsible stories describing this intoxication as a case of ‘mass hysteria’ or 
as the result of a plot by US unions." 
In addition to safety and health problems, recent reports indicate the persistence of 
sub-standard working conditions including inadequate ventilation, excessive heat, denial 
of permission to drink water or use the restrooms, and abusive treatment. Threats of 
dismissal of anyone who attempts to form a union are reported, as is the use of blacklists 
to prevent union organizers from being re-hired in the maquilas.132 
1. Anthony Fashion 
Anthony Fashion, a subsidiary of the New-Jersey based Metrix Computer Cutting, 
Inc., opened in 1998 in the San Bartolo free trade zone. On December 20, 2002, the 
company announced that it was suspending production due to a lack of orders for US 
retailers Liz Claiborne and Leslie Fay. The company failed to pay salaries and end-of-
year bonuses to its 700 workers. The back wages (but not the bonuses) were paid on 
December 30, and on January 6 the company announced that it was closing permanently. 
At the same time, the company was reorganized under a new name. Anthony Fashion 
also failed to pay legally required bonuses and pension and social security contributions 
for the 13 months prior to its shutdown. The workers have filed some 350 complaints in 
the labor courts for the unpaid contributions. The Labor Ministry provided the workers 
with documentation of the unpaid social security contributions ($260,000) and pension 
contributions ($120,000), but refused to provide them with documentation of unpaid 
bonuses, without which the workers are unable to pursue their legal claims against the 
company. Labor inspectors showed workers a copy of a letter from a representative of 
the factory owner to the Labor Minister requesting that neither the workers nor their 
union be given the documentation that they requested to pursue their legal cases. The 
letter reads, in part: 
It is important to tell you that unscrupulous people are using the media to generate 
negative propaganda against by representative [Anthony Fashion]; said people are 
supposed trade unionists who have nothing to do with the company that I 
represent, as they do not even work there; it is for that reason that I ask you to 
order your assistants to use appropriate discretion with respect to information that 
this company gives to this Ministry, because said information falling into evil 
hands would cause the situation of the company to become even more 
Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos. Informe Especial de car deter preliminar de la 
Señora Procuradora para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos sobre el caso de intoxicación masiva de 
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complicated and arrive at a point where the business was unable tom pay for 
itself. 
The refusal to provide information to workers about their unpaid bonuses was 
reiterated on January 17 by the Vice-Minister, who threatened sanctions against labor 
inspectors who had given information orally. 
On March 19, the Procurator-General of the Republic informed the union that 298 
individual cases were in danger of being dropped because the owner of the company was 
outside the country and could not be served. The union explained that it had not been 
able to take legal action to place an embargo on the company’s property because of the 
Labor Minsitry’s refusal to turn over information to the Attorney General. Despite a 
promise by the General Labor Inspector to provide the information, the union soon 
learned that the plant’s equipment was being sold to other free zone companies. The 
union has appealed to the National Assembly for assistance in compelling the Salvadoran 
Ambassador to the US to track down the owner of Metrix Computer Cutting.133 
2. Tainan 
Another serious current case of worker rights violations in the maquilas concerns the 
TS2 factory in the San Bartolo free trade zone, owned by the Taiwanese multinational 
Tainan Enterprises and producing for the Gap and other U.S. retailers. In 2000, workers 
began organizing a section of the Union of Workers of the Textile Industry (STIT). The 
organizing effort faced a series of reprisals, including the firing of two union leaders on 
February 26 and continued efforts by management to force workers to join a company-
sponsored union. The union asked the Labor Ministry for legal recognition on May 23 
and finally received it on July 9. Union supporters continued to receive threats of 
dismissal and physical attacks. 
On October 17, 2001, 109 workers from the unionized TS2 plant in Tainan were 
illegally suspended. A protest organized by the union caused Tainan to reinstate the 
suspended workers on November 4. STIT continued to organize and on April 18, 2002 
presented evidence of majority support required to negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement (the first case of collective bargaining in the Salvadoran maquilas). That same 
week, Tainan announced that it was shutting down its plants because its clients allegedly 
no longer wished to work with unionized workers. On April 26, 2002, Tainan began 
breaking down its machinery in the San Bartolo factory. On September 13, 2002, a judge 
of the Fourth Labor Court declared Tainan’s suspension of its employees’ work contracts 
illegal.134 
In response to international pressure on Tainan Enterprises from retailers, human 
rights groups, and unions in the United States, Europe, and Taiwan, and agreement was 
signed between STIT and Tainan Enterprises on November 21, 2002. This agreement 
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establishes a mechanism for opening a new factory with guarantees of respect for the 
workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively. The government of El Salvador has 
played no role in the resolution of this conflict.135 
3. Primo 
Many of the workers who lost employment when the TS2 factor closed in April 2002 
sought employment at other factories in the San Bartolo FTZ. However, in may cases 
they were turned away, even when the factories were hiring other workers. Evidence 
obtained by the Worker Rights Consortium demonstrates that Primo S.A. de C.V., one of 
the largest factories in the FTZ, systematically denied employment to former Tainan 
employees because of the perception by Primo management that Tainan workers were 
union supporters. For example, Primo demanded constancias (documentation of 
employment history) from ex-Tainan workers but not from other job applicants. Primo’s 
hiring director told a number of job applicants that constancias were required from ex-
Tainan workers because they were trade unionists. Primo either changed its hiring policy 
In April 200, when ex-Tainan workers begin applying for jobs, or maintained different 
hiring policies for different groups of applicants. In many cases, Primo managers 
explicitly told job applicants that Primo would not hire ex-Tainan workers because of 
their union affiliation. In addition to specific evidence of blacklisting by Primo, the 
WRC investigation found evidence that blacklisting is a widespread practice among 
employers in the San Bartolo FTZ.136 
4. INSINCA 
On July 31, 2002, the administration of the INSINCA maquila suspended the 
contracts of 640 employees, all members of the Union of Workers of the Textile Industry 
(STIT) and proceeded to distribute severance pay, stating that the firm was undergoing a 
process of reorganization. The administration promised all workers that they would be 
re-contracted once operations began again but that they would be working under new 
labor conditions, which included the loss of annual bonuses and 25 days of vacation leave 
per year. The legal department of INSINCA instructed workers that in order to receive 
severance payments, they would have to sign a letter relieving the company of all 
responsibility. Many of the suspended workers were not re-contracted; those who were 
have lost the benefits they previously enjoyed. INSINCA used the mass firing to 
undermine the union. In addition to the dismissal of hundreds of union members, 12 
leaders of the STIT union were also denied access to the factory. INSINCA has refused 
to re-hire the union leaders. 
Under Articles 36 and 37 of the Labor Code, reorganization of production to reduce 
costs does not constitute legal cause for suspending employees’ individual labor 
contracts. Moreover, Article 47 of the Constitution and Article 248 of the Labor Code 
prohibit the firing or suspension of union organizers and leaders during their tenure and 
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for one year thereafter. INSINCA’s firing of union leaders directly violated these 
provisions. STIT first appealed to the Labor Ministry, which produced no results; the 
Ministry’s refusal to order an inspection is being appealed to the courts. A request to the 
Fourth Labor Court to declare INSINCA’s action a lockout was also rejected. 
5. Lido 
The Union of Empresa Lido, S.A. (SELSA) was founded on November 22, 1959 and 
won legal recognition on February 12, 1961. Clause 43 of the collective bargaining 
agreement between Lido and SELSA establishes that salaries will be reviewed during the 
first fifteen days of January each year. In 2002, Lido failed to do so and SELSA began 
direct negotiations with Lido. SELSA brought up several different proposals for 
increasing worker salaries; Lido did not raise salaries. During the subsequent 
conciliation period that followed the negotiations, Lido brought forth its own suggestions, 
including a 5% reduction in worker salaries, in clear violation of Article 30 of the Labor 
Code that prohibits the reduction of salaries without legal cause. 
In order to pressure the company, SELSA organized a one-day work stoppage on 
May 6, 2002, in which 320 of the 350 workers in the factory participated. On May 7, 
Lido locked out 36 SELSA members including all 11 members of the union executive. 
Four more workers were denied entry to the factory on may 8 and one more on May 9, 
for a total of 41. 
Lido brought an action in the Second Labor Court asking to have the job action 
declared an illegal strike. The court denied this request, finding that it was the company 
that was preventing the 41 workers from entering the workplace. The union also brought 
a case in the Third Labor Court asking to have the action legally declared a lockout 
(defined in Salvadoran labor law as a “total suspension of work”), but the Court declined 
to do so. The union also asked the Labor Ministry to extend the conciliation period and 
to investigate the company’s denial of entry to the union members. SELSA relied on 
Article 47 of the Constitution, Article 248 of the Labor Code, and the collective contract 
with Lido, all of which state that union members cannot be fired, dismissed, or suspended 
except for legal cause previously established by a competent authority. Nevertheless, 
Lido continues to deny workplace access to the 11 union leaders and the 30 SELSA-
affiliated workers. 
In its examination of this case, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
reached the following conclusions. First, it determined that the Labor Ministry had no 
authority to declare the May 7 work stoppage illegal. Second, in view of the ruling of the 
Second Labor Court that no strike had occurred on May 7, the Committee found it 
plausible that the company had retaliated against the locked-out workers for anti-union 
motives, and asked the government to obtain a prompt judicial resolution of this question. 
With respect to the government position that strikes are prohibited during the term of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the Committee stated that such a prohibition must be 
CEAL, Recopilación de las principales violaciones 
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compensated by the availability of rapid and effective mechanisms to resolve disputes 
that arise over the application of the conflict. The Committee also asked the government 
to promptly investigate the union’s claims that its members had been pressured to drop 
their legal claims. Finally, the Committee requested that the government allow the union 
leaders access to the workplace. 
6. Del Sur 
The Union of the Electrical Industry of El Salvador (SIES), representing employees 
of recently-privatized electricity distribution firms, has denounced systematic violations 
of its collective bargaining agreement with the “Del Sur” electric company, a subsidiary 
of the Pennsylvania-based PPL Global. A particular concern has been inadequate safety 
and health procedures used by subcontractors, resulting in three deaths and several 
injuries. In April 2003, a delegation from SIES traveled to the U.S. to present the union’s 
concerns to PPL officials. However, when the members of the delegation returned they 
were publicly accused by the company of having jeopardized the workers’ jobs for 
personal gain. The Labor Ministry has taken no action to resolve these problems despite 
numerous requests from SIES. 
7. Nestle 
In 1995, Nestle El Salvador S.A. purchased Productos de Café, S.A., whose 288 
workers were represented by the Association of Workers of Coffee Products, S.A. 
(ASTPROCSA), subsequently reorganized as the Union of Workers of Nestle, S.A. 
(SETNESSA). Despite assurances from the new owners that employment would not be 
reduced, the company began a series of dismissals - 26 in 1995 (25 union members), 15 
in 1996 (13 union members), and 19 in 1997 (18 members). Currently the workforce has 
been reduced to 74 non-administrative employees, of whom 65 are union members. 
On March 5, 2003, the company demanded that the union vacate its office by March 
14. On April 18, the company summoned the union leaders to a meeting to announce the 
closing of the factory plant on April 30. Despite the existence of a collective bargaining 
agreement, a letter from the company dated May 5 offering severance pay stipulates that 
“these conditions are not subject to any type of negotiation.” The union filed a complaint 
with the Fourth Labor Judge on May 30. The Labor Ministry has taken no action to 
mediate the conflict. 
C. Denial of Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize and Bargain 
Collectively in the Public Sector 
ILO, Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 330, Case No. 2208, paras. 599-605. 
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Over the past two years, the government has used public sector “modernization” 
programs financed by the Inter-American Development Bank to undermine unions in 
the public sector, systematically violating collective bargaining agreements and targeting 
union leaders for dismissal. 
Using civil service reforms enacted in December 2001, the Executive gave last 
minute notice of dismissal to 15,664 public employees. At the same time, the number of 
workers on temporary contracts was increased. A report by the government’s Human 
Rights Procurator pointed out numerous human rights violations in the retrenchment 
process, including use of dismissals for disciplinary purposes without due process, re-
contracting of dismissed workers to perform their previous jobs with reduced pay and 
benefits, and targeting of union leaders for dismissal. 
1. Health Care Sector 
The Salvadoran government’s efforts to privatize the public hospital system, violating 
the rights of health care workers and their unions, have provoked continuing conflict. In 
July 1999, workers affiliated with the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreño 
del Seguro Social (STISSS) were fired in violation of their collective agreement. STISSS 
began a work stoppage, which continued after more workers were fired in November. 
Doctors organized in the Sindicato de Médicos del Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro 
Social (SIMETRISS) joined the stoppage and eventually more than 10,000 doctors, 
nurses, and workers honored the strike. President Flores militarized work sites and fired 
221 more workers. On March 10, 2000, government representatives and union leaders 
established a “Reform Council of the Health Sector” to elaborate reform based on 
principles of equity. The Council presented a series of proposals to President Flores in 
December, which were ignored. 
In February 2001, a labor court ruled that the firing of the 221 workers in 1999 was 
illegal and ordered the government to re-hire them. On July 5, 2001, the Supreme Court 
upheld the ruling of the lower court and ordered the government to re-hire the workers 
with six months’ back wages. To this day, the government of El Salvador has not 
complied with that order. (ILO, Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 324, 
Case No. 2077.) 
In January 2002, riot police evicted STISSS members from their offices in violation 
of the union’s collective agreement. At the same time, SIMETRISS denounced the 
illegal firing of 10 union doctors. In September, STISSS called a one-day strike against 
the privatization and illegal firings; in response, 30 STISSS members were fired. The 
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union declared an indefinite strike and riot police forcibly and violently evicted STISSS 
members and leaders from several hospitals. 
On October 8, a labor court declared the ISSS strike illegal based on a strict 
interpretation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal. On 
October 15, President Flores unveiled his ISSS privatization plan and 50,000 doctors, 
nurses, and healthcare workers took to the streets in the first “White March” against the 
plan. On October 17, the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly passed the “State Guarantee 
of Health and Social Security” outlawing the privatization of healthcare and the 
electricity generation sector and on October 23, 200,000 workers participated in a second 
“White March.” STSEL union activists from the electricity generation sector joined the 
strike, demanding that neither healthcare nor electricity generation be privatized and 
adding to a hunger strike that began on October 23. On November 9, 300,000 people 
joined in another protest. 
Shortly thereafter, the National Assembly rejected the President’s arguments and 
144 
approved a decree halting the privatization of public health services. This decree was 
reversed when the deputies of the PCN switched sides and voted with ARENA to 
override the decree. The strike continued into 2003, with increasing deployment of 
troops in hospitals. In March, legislative elections narrowly shifted the balance of votes 
in the Assembly, which on April 10 again approved a decree reinstating the striking 
health care workers. Also in April, there were press reports that some $800,000 in public 
health care funds had been misappropriated by private subcontractors. 
On May 1, President Flores announced that he would veto the reinstatement decree. 
An attempt to override the veto on May 15 was unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter, a new 
attempt to negotiate a resolution was initiated with participation of the Archbishop of San 
Salvador. 
More than 30 leaders of the strike have received anonymous death threat calls from a 
caller who identifies himself as part of the “Comando de Exterminio” or Extermination 
Commando. Death threats such as these are an echo from the violent past in El 
Salvador. 
2. CEL 
The Union of Electrical Sector Workers (STSEL) is an important union composed of 
four sections, each with a collective contract. Three of these contracts are with entities 
that have taken over energy distribution (GESAL, ETESAL, and Duke Energy); the 
fourth is with the parastatal Rio Lempa Electricity Commission (CEL). Between 1992 
and 1999, re-structuring of the electricity sector has had an important impact on working 
conditions, and STSEL has played a key role in defending labor rights in this sector. 
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In 2001, CEL launched a campaign to weaken the union. On September 24, CEL 
fired a union leader, Mario Roberto Carranza Hernandez. Under Salvadoran law, 
Hernandez, as a union leader, would normally be protected but on September 20, 4 days 
before the firing, the chief of the Department of Social Organizations in the Ministry of 
Labor classified Hernández as a confidential employee, without completing a number of 
the legally required procedures. 
On November 12, CEL fired six workers, including a member of the union executive, 
from the central offices. On March 19, 2002, eight affiliated workers were fired from the 
hydroelectric plant. On April 1, three workers were fired from CEL, two of them union 
leaders. In total, 23 members including five executive members were fired as part of the 
campaign. In addition, CEL pressured workers to disaffiliate from STSEL, resulting in 
the withdrawal of 48 members between December 14, 2001 and April 15, 2002. The 
attack on STSEL accelerated with the firing of its General Secretary, Alirio Romero, and 
the General Secretary of the CEL section, Sará Isabel Quintanilla, on October 18, 2002, 
1 4 7 A 
in clear violation of the collective bargaining agreements. complaint is currently 
pending before the Chamber on Administrative Disputes of the Supreme Court; in 
addition, investigations have been initiated by the Human Rights Procurator and the 
Labor Commission of the National Assembly. 
In addition, CEL has refused to pay its workers the wages specified in the collective 
bargaining agreement with STSEL since April, 2002. The union filed a legal complaint 
on October 29. On May 6, the Second Labor Court ruled in favor of the union and 
ordered the company to pay the lost wages. CEL appealed this decision to the Supreme 
Court on May 8. 
3. CEPA - International Airport 
The Union of Workers of the International Airport of El Salvador (SITEAIES), 
representing workers at the international airport under a collective bargaining agreement 
with the airport authority (Comisión Ejecutive Portuaria Autónoma - CEPA), has for 
several years conducted a public campaign opposing the government’s plans to privatize 
the airport. Based on studies, the union has argued that the airport generates important 
income for the state and is a model of efficiency in the region. It has also pointed out the 
deficiencies in the services already provided by private contractors at the airport. 
On September 23, 2001 at 11:00 p.m., Salvadoran Armed Forces and specially 
trained police assault forces entered the airport without prior warning and proceeded to 
disarm airport security personnel The next day, the same forces denied entrance to airport 
personnel who worked in maintenance and loading zones. All of these workers were 
SITEAIES members. On September 25, the head of the armed forces at the airport 
informed workers that only those in maintenance could return and that the 157 employees 
Id. 
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Id; U.S. Department of State, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
43 
in loading were suspended. The suspended workers included 92% of the unionized cargo 
and security workers, while only 54% of non-unionized workers were suspended. 
Subsequently, workers were summoned individually or in small groups and told to sign 
letters renouncing their union membership that had been prepared in advance. 
CEPA refused to respond to the union’s inquiries and requests to meet. On September 
24, SITEAIES asked the Labor Ministry for an investigation and a declaration that CEPA 
was engaging in a lockout. The inspection, conducted on September 27, documented a 
series of anti-union actions including threats and denial of access to the union office; 
however, the Ministry refused to draw a legal conclusion or take any further action. The 
union also presented its claim that the employer was conducting an illegal lockout to a 
Civil Judge in Zacatecoluca on 24 September, basing its claim on Article 558 of the 
Labor Code and requesting a ruling within 24 hours as required by Article of 562 of the 
code. On September 28, the judge informed the union that the court would conduct an 
“inspection” of the airport (a procedure not contemplated in the Labor Code). Finding 
that the airport was operating, albeit with military personnel, the judge declared on 
October 1 that airport management had not violated the law. SITEAIES appealed the 
decision but the appeal was denied. On October 12, heavily armed soldiers and police 
attempted to break up a union assembly being held on the airport grounds but away from 
its operating areas. 
Meetings between SITEAIES and the Labor Minister, Jorge Isidro Nieto, as well as 
with the Comisión Ejecutive Portuaria Autónoma (CEPA) on October 17-19 were 
inconclusive. The head of CEPA did not attend the meetings. CEPA, however, offered 
compensation for all workers affected by management actions, essentially recognizing 
the illegality of those actions. The union, on the other hand, insisted that conditions 
return to normal and that workers return to their original positions at the airport. 
The union filed a complaint with the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
which asked the government to investigate the case. Likewise, the government’s 
Human Rights Procurator, in a report dated December 20, 2001, concluded that CEPA 
had illegally interfered with union activities and requested that the dismissed workers be 
reinstated with back pay. 
On February 26, 2002, SITEAIES and CEPA reached an agreement in which 64 
workers would be allowed to form a cooperative that would be contracted by CEPA for 
baggage handling. These workers are now working their same jobs as before but for less 
pay and without job security. On March 8, Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the 
President of El Salvador urging the President to ensure that union members at the airport 
can exercise their right of association and requesting a thorough investigation of the anti-
union actions. However, SITEAIES worker activists are still being pressured to resign, 
as evidenced by threats received on July 5 and August 13 of this year. 
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4. Ministry of Finance 
The Salvadoran Ministry of Labor’s repeated actions in denying legal recognition of 
SITRAMH (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Ministerio de Hacienda), the Finance Ministry 
workers’ union, points out two distinct problems: first, impediments to the formation of 
unions in the public sector and second, the retaliatory firing of union members. 
The use of legal formalities by the government to deny legal recognition to worker 
organizations has been condemned repeatedly by the ILO.153 Yet the government 
continues arbitrarily to block union requests for recognition. In May 2001, a group of 
employees of the Finance Ministry held a general assembly to constitute their union, 
SITRAMH. On May 15, 2001, the group presented a request for legal recognition of the 
union to the Ministry of Labor, which under law had 30 days to review it. On June 26, 
the Ministry issued a document rejecting the union’s application. This document was full 
of errors, including mistakenly referring to union members as workers of the Ministry of 
the Interior rather than the Ministry of Finance. On June 27, SITRAMH appealed the 
Ministry’s denial of recognition; the Ministry responded with a second rejection. The 
Ministry argued that the Labor Code did not apply to employees of the Finance Ministry 
and that the Constitution prohibits the formation of unions by public sector workers. The 
Constitution does prohibit certain categories of public employees to strike. But, Article 
47 of the Constitution explicitly recognizes the right of all workers to form unions. 
Starting in December 2001, massive firings of Finance Ministry workers occurred as 
some 217 positions were eliminated. Included among those fired were 14 constituent 
members of SITRAMH and 14 members of the existing Association of Finance Ministry 
Employees (AGEMHA). Other AGEMHA executive members were moved from 
permanent to contract positions.154 
5. SITINPEP 
The Union of Workers of the National Institute of Public Employee Pensions 
(SITINPEP) was also affected by the government’s restructuring plans. During 2001, the 
Institute developed plans for cutbacks in personnel without consulting the union, in 
violation of clauses in the collective bargaining agreement that require the union to be 
provided with this information and despite numerous information requests. In December, 
the Institute announced the elimination of 150 positions (100 more than the Assembly 
had authorized). Of 92 employees who received dismissal notices, 55 were union 
members, including three former union executive members whose tenure was protected 
under Article 47 of the Constitution and Article 248 of the Labor Code. INPEP followed 
these dismissals with a campaign of intimidation intended to persuade the remaining 
union members to renounce their membership. Of 136 union members, 55 were fired, 29 
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accepted severance, and 12 gave up their membership, leaving only 49. The Human 
Rights Procurator’s report on INPEP cites numerous violations of the collective 
bargaining agreement, the Institute’s regulations, the Constitution and the Labor Code. 
Likewise, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has asked the government to 
ensure that INPEP management respects the collective bargaining agreement and has 
requested an investigation into the firings. 
D. Child Labor 
Despite protections in Salvadoran law, child labor continues to be a serious problem. 
There are an estimated 440,000 working children, and at least 60,000 children ages 10-14 
provide part of the necessary income for their families’ survival. Protective legislation 
has had little impact in the face of poverty, for “in El Salvador the laws and regulations 
concerning child work are widely disregarded by poverty-stricken families and 
unscrupulous employers, even when work is hazardous and clearly forbidden by law.” 
A series of sectoral assessments by the ILO’s International Program for the 
Eradication of Child Labor (IPEC) illustrate the problems faced by child workers. In the 
fishing industry, for example, most child workers work 7-8 hours per day. About 20% 
also attend school, but only 4% complete ninth grade. They are hired on daily 
contracts, usually verbal, and the majority are paid cash and/or a share of the catch at the 
end of the day. The majority of child workers believe that the payment they receive is 
never enough. Children are exposed to serious physical hazards ranging from shark 
attacks to use of explosives. Worker rights are unprotected as there are no unions and 
the labor contracts are volatile and short in duration. 
In the harvesting of sugar cane, child labor is pervasive, with nearly 70% of the 
workers under 14. Most are paid cash for a workday that begins at 6 a.m., followed by 
school for those who attend. Other IPEC studies describe the difficulties faced by 
child laborers in the urban informal economy, domestic service, and garbage 
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scavenging. A study on commercial sexual exploitation of children and adolescents 
found that nearly 40% start commercial sexual relations before the age of 14. 
V. GUATEMALA 
The AFL-CIO petitioned USTR to terminate Guatemala’s GSP benefits in August 
2000. Shortly thereafter, USTR self-initiated a review of Guatemala’s eligibility for GSP 
benefits. A hearing was held in March of 2001. USTR lifted the review on May 31, 
2001 following the trial of 22 persons accused in the assault on leaders of the banana 
workers’ union SITRABI and the enactment of a labor law reform bill on May 14. The 
SITRABI trial resulted in convictions of 22 individuals, but none had to serve a jail term. 
In contrast, the five union leaders who had been assaulted were forced to leave the 
country and seek political asylum in the US. 
Despite pressure from USTR, the government of Guatemala continues to 
systematically violate workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. According to the State Department, the government of Guatemala “does not 
enforce effectively labor laws to protect workers who exercise their rights.” 
Guatemalan labor courts are characterized by lengthy backlogs, delays, and above all the 
inability to enforce their decisions. No progress has been made to address the impunity 
issue in the numerous other cases cited in the AFL-CIO’s petition or in many other cases 
raised in prior petitions, including cases such as Empresa Exacta which were previously 
presented as benchmark cases. In particular, no progress has been made in bringing to 
justice the persons responsible for six recent assassinations of trade unionists: Robinson 
Manolo Morales Canales, Hugo Rolando Duarte and Jose Alfredo Chacon Ramirez in 
January 1999; Angel Pineda in March 1999; Baldomero de Jesus Ramirez in June 1999; 
Oswaldo Monzon Lima in June 2000, andBaudillo Arnado Cermeño Ramírez in 
December 2001. The ILO and MINUGUA continues to express serious concern over 
widespread reports of physical violence and threats against workers who attempt to 
exercise their trade union rights. 
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Sex discrimination - for example the exclusion of domestic workers from protections 
afforded to other workers under Guatemalan labor law or the interrogation of maquila 
workers about their reproductive behavior - has a serious adverse impact on workers’ 
exercise of their rights to organize and bargain collectively as well as acceptable 
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational 
safety and health. The February 2002 report by Human Rights Watch on sex 
discrimination in the Guatemalan labor force extensively documents this problem. 
A. Labor Law Reforms are Inadequate to Protect Fundamental Workers’ Rights 
The labor law reform approved in April 2002 falls far short of the ILO’s 
recommendations in key aspects. While the law was improved by affording agricultural 
workers the right to strike during the harvest, there is no evidence that workers in the 
countryside (where impunity is most pronounced) have been able to exercise this right in 
any meaningful way. Indeed, this provision is undermined by the President’s broad 
discretion to ban strikes in “essential economic activities,” while a highly burdensome 
requirement is established for the formation of industrial unions - 50% plus one of all 
workers in the industry. 
Recent cases demonstrate the failure of the Labor Code reforms to improve respect 
for worker rights. The new Article 209 is designed to protect workers in the process of 
forming a union. It states that workers who have informed the Labor Ministry of their 
intention to unionize are protected from being fired. It also states that any worker who 
violates article 77 (which outlines justifications for firing workers) cannot be fired 
without a court’s authorization. The new Article 380 extends protection to all workers at 
a work site where a judge has declared a “collective conflict.” 
Both Article 209 and Article 380 have stipulations for the immediate reinstatement of 
workers fired without authorization. But the government simply refuses to enforce these 
provisions. For example: 
• At the Finca Maria Lourdes in Quetzaltenango, 55 workers have been illegally 
fired since 1995. The labor court has issued seven separate resolutions ordering 
reinstatement for the fired workers. Each resolution explains that the workers 
were fired in violation of Article 209 of the Guatemalan Labor Code, which 
stipulates that workers fired without proper authorization must be reinstated 
within 24 hours. However, not one of the reinstatement orders has been enforced. 
• Salama Horticulture in Baja Verapaz illegally fired 52 workers who were 
attempting to organize a union on August 27, 1997. Despite a ruling from the 
Guatemalan Supreme Court in 1999 ordering their reinstatement, the employer 
has not allowed them to return. 
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• In the case of the electrical distributor DEOCSA, a labor court ordered the 
immediate reinstatement of nine fired union members on October 18, 2002. 
However, the nine employees have not been reinstated. 
These cases demonstrate that labor law reforms will be ineffective so long as the 
government of Guatemala (including all three branches of government) lacks the will to 
fairly apply and effectively enforce laws that protect fundamental worker rights. 
Other provisions of Guatemalan labor law continue to draw criticism. These include 
the requirement in section 241 of the Labor Code that to call a strike the workers must 
constitute 50 per cent plus one of those working in the enterprise (without including in 
the total workers in positions of confidence or who represent the employer), the 
imposition of compulsory arbitration without the possibility of resorting to a strike in 
public services which are not essential in the strict sense of the term (such as public 
transport and energy provision), and the prohibition of sympathy strikes by trade 
175 
unions. 
Guatemalan unions report that there has been no consultation by the government 
regarding the preliminary drafts of the Code of Procedure for Labor Matters that have 
been presented to the Congress. 
B. The Labor Ministry and the Courts Fail to Enforce Labor Laws Effectively 
The government continues to tolerate violence directed against union leaders. 
According to the 2002 Human Rights report, “retaliation, including firing, intimidation, 
and sometimes violence, by employers and others against workers who try to exercise 
176 
internationally recognized labor rights is common and usually goes unsanctioned. The 
report continues: 
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Labor leaders reported receiving death threats and other acts of intimidation. In its 
September report on human rights, MINUGUA reported threats to the head of the 
immigration workers’ union and the UNSITRAGUA labor federation, as well as 
the attempted shooting of the leader of the municipal workers union of Nueva 
Concepcion, Escuintla. On November 27, the bodies of Carlos Francisco Guzman 
Lanuza, the Secretary General of the Municipal Employees Union of Nueva 
Concepcion and leader of a union of South Coast workers, and his brother were 
discovered on a highway near Nueva Concepcion, Escuintla province. They died 
from multiple bullet wounds. According to MINUGUA, since 2001 Nueva 
Concepcion had been plagued by violence from armed groups associated with the 
mayor, Augusto Linares Arana. The investigation of the case by the Special 
Prosecutor for Crimes Against Unionists had produced no arrests at year’s end. 
The General Central Union of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG) described death 
threats and other forms of intimidation received by a member of the municipal 
union of Chichicastenango, another member of commercial workers’ union of 
Chichicastenango (both from municipal officials), by two leaders of the 
Professional Heavy Truckers Union, and by the leader of the municipal union of 
Puerto Barrios. On May 13, the adult son of the leader of the National Federation 
of Public Servants (FENASEP) was killed in the capital. The CGTG claims that 
none of these acts has been investigated adequately. 
In June 2001, the Public Ministry assigned a Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against 
Unionists and Journalists to review these and all new cases involving union members. 
Since its inception, the Special Prosecutor's Office accepted 80 cases involving union 
members, 31 of which remained under investigation at year's end. Only two suspects 
have been brought before a judge and one person has been detained. The remainder of the 
cases were found to be without merit by judges or by the Prosecutor's Office. Arrest 
warrants have been issued in only two cases. In October MINUGUA reported that labor 
leaders and unions had received 288 threats against them from January 1, 2000-
September 15, including 158 death threats; 4 killings of unionists were registered during 
that period. Another such killing occurred in November. The ILO has urged the 
government to use the Special Prosecutor’s office to investigate cases of anti-union 
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violence. 
Both the State Department and the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA) have acknowledged the serious problems of administering justice in 
Guatemala. The United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), in its Report on the 
Administration of Labor Justice, concludes that “there exists serious legal inconveniences 
and practices that make it impossible to achieve effective labor norms such as prompt and 
thorough treatment by the justice system." Guatemalan labor courts are characterized 
by lengthy backlogs, delays, and above all the inability to enforce their decisions. The 
State Department reports that the “weakness of the judicial system as a whole, the severe 
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shortage of competent judges and staff, a heavy backlog of undecided cases, and failure 
to enforce effectively court rulings all contribute to the labor courts' lack of credibility 
and effectiveness." 
According to the U.S. State Depoartment, “The labor inspection system remains 
ineffective and corrupt, despite continuing efforts at improvement. Low pay, the lack of 
a strong ethic of public service, and ineffective management prevent the Ministry from 
providing effective service.” Employers can refuse to allow labor inspectors on to 
their premises and disregard Labor Ministry directives, with little fear of 
consequences. 
These problems are symptomatic of structural deficiencies in the Guatemalan legal 
system, including “serious problems in the systems and procedures for delivering justice, 
as well as the paralyzing effect of attempts to coerce those involved in the pursuit and 
administration of justice through threats and corruption." 
Guatemalan employers can retaliate against workers who attempt to organize with 
little fear of punishment. The State Department notes that “Although the Labor Code 
provides that workers fired illegally for union activity should be reinstated within 24 
hours, in practice employers have filed a series of appeals or simply defied judicial orders 
for reinstatement.... Some workers who suffer illegal dismissal take their case to the 
labor courts and win injunctions of reinstatement. Appeals and re-appeals by the 
employers, along with legal ploys such as re-incorporation as a different entity, often 
prolong proceedings for years. The labor courts generally do not dismiss frivolous 
appeals, nor are their decisions enforced. According to Labor Ministry officials, the labor 
courts vindicate the majority of workers’ claims against employers. However, employers 
comply with the court decisions in only a small number of cases, creating a climate of 
impunity. Often employers are not disciplined for not complying with legally binding 
court orders." 
The government has used the legal provision for suspending the export license of 
maquiladoras that violate worker rights (Decree 29-89) in the Inexport case, and at one 
point used the threat of suspension to pressure the employer at Choi Shin. In an 
alarming recent development, the government has threatened to use this provision shut 
down three maquiladoras, including the only two in the country that have unions, Choi 
Shin and Cimatextiles. This ill-timed move creates the impression that the government 
is targeting unionized factories for closure. 
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C. Case Studies 
1. New Attacks on the SITRABI Banana Workers’ Union 
Recent months have witnessed the rekindling of labor strife on the Bobos District 
independent banana plantations in Izabal. The Bobos District plantations were the site of 
grave labor violations in 1999 when SITRABI union members and leaders were attacked 
by local armed individuals shortly before holding a protest related to the handing over of 
three plantations to independent producers under unilaterally determined conditions and 
without negotiating with the union.. The attacks were intended to repress collective 
action and debilitate the union’s efforts to represent workers in the sector. Union 
members were detained at gunpoint and forced to renounce their affiliations and their 
employment with the Bandegua company. The attack precipitated a two-year struggle to 
gain a trial of the attackers and a one year effort to end the Bobos District conflict and put 
the workers back to work under new management (independent producers), union 
representation by SITRABI and collective bargaining agreements. 
To date 22 individuals have been convicted of minor trespassing charges in 
connection with the 1999 assault. Five members of SITRABI leadership remain in exile. 
And the Bobos District plantations, although independently administered, continue to 
produce exclusively for the Fresh Del Monte Produce Company subsidiary in Guatemala, 
Bandegua. 
The current conflict involves unions representing workers from the three independent 
banana plantations in the Bobos district. In October 2000, these unions signed a 
collective bargaining agreement with Bandegua.. The conditions of the contract were not 
ideal. In particular, wage stipulations were set at the industry minimum. Over the past 
three years, the unions have engaged management in a continuing process of 
renegotiation and some improvements in the terms of the contract have been achieved. 
However, in February of 2003, the management of two of the three plantations, Lourdes 
and Fatima, broke off dialogue with workers and their representatives. 
After management’s refusal to continue negotiating, a group of nine workers 
organized an informal work stoppage in the fruit cutting section of the plantation 
Lourdes. These workers were promptly suspended. In response to the suspensions, 18 
workers (including the original nine) set up a road blockade and for two days prevented 
any product from being transported to the coast for exportation. As a consequence, all 18 
workers were fired. This led to more protests and, in turn, more firings. Over a two-
week period (approximately February 12 to February 26) over 38 workers were fired and 
protests (a combination of work stoppages and road blockades) effectively halted 
production on the three Bobos District plantations. 
On March 16, with the number of fired employees at 38, the Guatemalan Department 
of Labor recommended the reinstatement of 29 employees. The union accepted the offer, 
but plantation management rejected it. At this point the owner Sergio Gabriel Monzon, 
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signaled his intention to abandon the plantations. Monzon claimed that damages done 
during the protest had left his property unredeemable. In fact, the damage was sustained 
during torrential windstorms, and is considered by workers to be largely a result of 
Monzon’s negligence of basic maintenance procedures. 
Monzon’s refusal to reinstate the fired workers sparked a new wave of protests, and 
workers from the neighboring Fatima plantation joined roadblocks. The roadblocks, 
however, proved unnecessary because the storm-damaged plantations never fully 
recovered their production. 
As of May 1, a total of 98 workers had been fired or suspended from the plantations 
in question. Monzon has officially announced his intention to sell the Lourdes and 
Fatima plantations, and has filed both civil and criminal charges against 68 workers 
including members of the SITRABI executive committee. Among the charges, SITRABI 
leaders have been accused as the intellectual authors of kidnapping, coercion, and 
extortion. The civil charges sue SITRABI for $120,000 in damages. In addition, a judge 
embargoed all SITRABI union dues. This measure threatened to prevent the union from 
carrying out is representative functions and from providing services to its members 
including funeral benefits, retirement travel vouchers, worker trainings, and emergency 
blood transfusions. Subsequently, Bandegua agreed to continue depositing dues 
payments with the SITRABI cooperative. 
Currently, production remains halted and none of the 300 employees are actually 
working. A new owner is negotiating with Monzon to purchase the plantations. The new 
producer has met with SITRABI and promised to reopen the plantations, reinstate all of 
the fired employees, and respect the existing collective bargaining agreement. SITRABI 
has agreed to push back the negotiation of a new contract six to nine months. 
Despite the change in producers and a new commitment to reinitiate production on 
the plantations, Monzon has dropped neither the civil claim nor the criminal charges. The 
government has not moved to issue arrest warrants. Nevertheless the criminal charges 
pose a serious threat to the union leadership. Three of the charges are unbondable, so 
SITRABI’s executive committee could be imprisoned waiting for trial, which can take 
years in the Guatemalan system. SITRABI has initiated a counter-claim against Monzon, 
who failed to show up for a May 28 meeting with the labor inspector and the union, 
claiming that he had been out of the country. 
These charges are a direct attack on SITRABI’s right to free association. SITRABI 
connection/ participation in the blockades/ work stoppages at the Bobos district 
plantations is, at best, indirect. SITRABI has maintained that the protests at the Bobos 
District plantations were independently organized and carried out. As affiliated 
plantations, of course, SITRABI’s executive committee was aware of the activities of 
union members at the Lourdes and Fatima. But to suggest that SITRABI’s executive 
committee is the intellectual author of the incidents is a gross mischaracterization of 
SITRABI’s role in the protests. At no point did SITRABI’s executive committee 
encourage work stoppages or roadblocks. To the contrary, SITRABI strongly advised its 
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union members not to halt production, and as its willingness to accept the labor 
department’s recommendations demonstrate, it has only advocated a peaceful resolution 
to the present conflict. 
It must be emphasized that this is a labor conflict. Roadblocks and work stoppages 
are a frequently used tactic in the Bobos District. When faced with labor disputes, 
workers at independent plantations have little recourse but to halt production and prevent 
exportation. Plantation management generally respects this practice (form of protest). 
The filing of criminal and civil charges in response to the February protests represents a 
significant aberration in labor relations in the Bobos District. In the current situation the 
involvement of criminal and civil courts have nothing to do with recovering damages or 
seeing justice done, instead it is a blatant attempt to punish the SITRABI union for its 
activism in the independent banana plantations. It is an attempt to decapitate one of the 
only sources of organization and support for banana workers in Guatemala. 
2. Continuing Violations of Worker Rights in Guatemala’s Maquiladoras 
There are no collective bargaining agreements between employers and any of the 
more 100,000 workers in the for-export zones and maquila sector. Union leaders’ 
inability to organize workers in these zones is caused by employer intimidation and 
pressure as well as unofficial restrictions on their access to the EPZs. 
A Human Rights Watch report released in February 2002 aptly summarizes the 
current situation of freedom of association in Guatemala’s maquiladora export factories: 
... only one labor union, FESTRAS, is organizing in the maquilas. Previous 
efforts to form labor unions in the maquila sector have met with devastating 
resistance from the industry as a whole and, at best, government negligence. 
Unionization efforts have been countered with mass dismissals, intimidation, 
indiscriminate retaliation against all workers, and plant closings. Although some 
unions have been formed in some maquilas, in none of these factories have union 
member emerged unpunished by management." 
No progress has been made in taking either criminal or disciplinary measures against 
the persons responsible for the July 18, 2001 assaults on workers at the Choi Shin and 
Cimatextiles maquilas, who were attempting to organize a union with support from 
FESTRAS. The union leaders were surrounded by a group of other workers who 
began throwing rocks, bottles, and food at them as supervisors watched. Union members 
who were able to return to the factory were forcibly removed by the mob and in some 
cases beaten. Riot police arrived after about two hours, but stayed for only half an hour 
and did not enter the plant. Ten union members who were stuck inside the factory, 
fearing for their safety, signed letters resigning from the union. When union supporters 
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reported to work the next day, they were met with death threats and were then assaulted 
again with rocks, bottles, sticks, and fists. Police arrived but did not intervene to assist 
the union supporters trapped inside the plant. After three hours, riot police arrived and 
succeeded in allowing the workers to leave. Unable to return to the plant the next day, 
the workers went to the Labor Ministry to file a complaint. On July 21 they again 
attempted to report to work but were again met by a mob. Both management and police 
stated that they could not guarantee the workers’ safety. 
Union leaders attributed the blame for the attacks to company managers. According 
to the State Department, “Credible reports allege that management through floor 
supervisors planned and organized anti-union violence (consisting of beatings and bottle 
and rock throwing which caused several minor injuries) and intimidation. Further 
details are provided in a report from COVERCO, an independent monitoring group, that 
describes how factory managers encouraged anti-union workers to identify union 
workers and pressure them to resign. COVERCO further notes that seven union workers 
were forced to resign on July 18 despite an existing injunction against unauthorized 
firings issued by a labor court judge. Although these workers were later reinstated, the 
dispute over back pay and severance packages lingered for weeks. 
Both the State Department and COVERCO note that lack of involvement of 
government authorities during the periods of greatest unrest at the Choi Shin/ 
Cimatextiles plants in July of 2001. The Ministry of Labor did not enter the factories 
until July 20, a day after the violence had ended, despite being called by both 
management and union representatives. Furthermore, the police refused to enter the 
factories while union employees were being attacked. 
As a result of the violence in the plant, the Labor Ministry ordered bi-weekly 
meetings between union representatives and factory administration. However, these 
meetings were held only a few times, and have now been suspended. Union leaders at 
Choi Shin and Cimatextiles complain that a constant, antiunion campaign persists. The 
companies’ actions include: 
• promoting “solidarista” associations, under management control, asn an 
alternative to the union; 
• offering workers bribes to resign form the union; 
• instilling fear in non-union workers in order to incite them to violence; 
• failing to take disciplinary measures against workers guilty of violence; 
• securing letters of resignation from union supporters under duress; 
• allegedly threatening workers and their families in their homes and 
neighborhoods; 
• encouraging non-union workers to paint anti-union banners during working hours 
and with materials supplied by the company; 
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• unilaterally changing the working conditions of union supporters; 
• threatening union leaders with blacklisting; 
• interfering in internal union affairs by demanding a list of union members in order 
to argue that the union no longer has the legally-required minimum number of 
members. 
In addition, workers in the factories have reported denial of overtime hours, false 
accusations of robbery and drug use, and the consistent circulation of factory-closing 
rumors. At least one union affiliated worker in Cimatextiles was fired in March of 2002, 
after being accused of stealing factory property. The dismissal took place despite an 
existing injunction against unauthorized firings. The charges were later dropped and a 
labor judge order the immediate reinstatement of the employee in September of 2002. 
However, the company has refused to honor the reinstatement. Union organizers report 
that many workers are scared to talk with union members and at times are openly hostile 
to the presence of the union in the factory. A dispute over a change in vacation policy 
nearly resulted in another violent incident in April of 2002. 
In its review of this case in March 2003, the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association stated: 
... The Committee deeply regrets that, in the light of the many serious allegations 
that have been made (some of them relating to serious offences such as threats 
and physical assaults), the government: (1) has confined itself to state that legal 
proceedings have been file concerning certain acts of violence and lists the series 
of legal proceedings; and (2) has not communicated specific enough observations 
on all allegations. Under these circumstances, the Committee strongly urges the 
government to insure that the investigation covers all the allegations made in this 
case, with a view to clarifying the facts, determining responsibility and punishing 
those responsible. The Committee requests the government urgently to send 
complete observations in this respect and to consult without delay the enterprises 
and trade unions concerned through the national organizations. 
3. Violations of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and Illegal Firings at 
DEOCSA and DEORSA 
DEOCSA and DEORSA, Western Electric Distributor and Eastern Distributor 
respectively, were created in 1999 when Guatemala privatized its energy distribution 
services. The two companies are owned and operated by the Union Fenosa, a 
transnational corporation based in Spain. In 1999, Union Fenosa signed an agreement 
with the existing union of electrical workers, STINDE. The agreement specified that 
there would be no extraordinary changes in employment status, level of pay, or benefits. 
In effect, labor relations would remain unaltered. However, this has not been the case. 
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Within two years of signing the agreement with the union of electrical employees, both 
DEORSA and DEOCSA implemented restructuring measures that called for the closing 
of various regional offices. As a result, employees were expected to transfer their site of 
employment to other departments in the country. In many cases, these transfers required 
daily commutes of more than 200 miles. When the workers protested the closings, they 
were given an ultimatum: move or quit. 
On September 26, STINDE solicited an injunction against unauthorized firings with 
the Labor Courts. The injunction was granted the same day. On October 7, nine 
employees refused to leave the DEOCSA office in Tecpan after it had been scheduled to 
be closed. DEOCSA management fired the nine employees and ordered private security 
guards to remove them from company property. The nine employees barricaded 
themselves in the building for the next eight days, over which time the company turned 
off the water and electricity. Inspectors from the Labor Ministry recommended that the 
fired workers be reinstated.198 
On October 18, the union asked the labor court to reinstate the nine employees. The 
union cited violations to both the original collective bargaining contract and the 
injunction of September 26. The labor court ordered their immediate reinstatement on 
October 18.199 However, the nine employees have not been reinstated. Legal 
representatives of DEORCSA and DEOCSA have offered to reinstate the employees only 
if the union removes its injunction against the company. The office in Tecpan has been 
closed. An out-of-court settlement between the union and the company will return the 
nine employees to work in Chimaltenango, not in Tecpan which is where the court had 
ordered them to be reinstated. 
As a result of their opposition to office closings, union leaders report have been made 
the targets of harassment and intimidation on the part of the administration. This has 
involved false accusations with the police and sporadic vigilance of their homes and 
places of employment. 
The union also reports that both DEORSA and DEOCSA have frustrated efforts to 
organize ‘meter-reader’ employees. The meter-readers are viewed by DEORSA and 
DEOCSA as independent contractors or micro-business. However, these employees are 
doing work previously assigned to by unionized employees. The meter-readers work 
long hours, often up to 10 a day, during a five hour work week, but receive a monthly 
salary of only Q1050 (about US$140). Furthermore, the meter readers are largely 
untrained, and, frankly, unqualified; it is reported that many readers cannot in fact read. 
As a result, service in many departments has been erratic, with costly errors in billing and 
administration. The consequences have been disastrous: angry consumers destroyed at 
least two company offices in the September and one in October. The union has 
repeatedly called for a more extensive training program and benefits for meter readers. 
However, the company has refused to discuss the issue. 
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4. Violations of the of Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Right to Strike 
at the Coca Cola Plant 
On 21 February 2001, the workers of the Coca Cola bottling plant union (STECSA) 
entered into collective bargaining negotiations with the owners of the bottling plant, 
EMBOCEN. Over the past year and half, the two sides have reached agreements on 69 
articles of the new contract. 16 articles remain in dispute. The 16 disputed articles cover 
a number of issues ranging from reduced vendor routes to a change in required hourly 
workweek to the denial of access to an on-property union meeting hall. 
According to STECSA, the 16 disputed articles would have detrimental consequences 
for the workers at the EMBOCEN plant. The union argues that the proposed articles 
would violate the Guatemalan Labor Code by imposing obligatory overtime on both 
vendor and line employees. Other articles would result in massive layoffs and drastically 
reduced pay increases. EMBOCEN insists the changes are necessary to maintain 
productivity and competitiveness. 
The negotiating process between STECSA and EMBOCEN has been marked by 
grave violations of workers’ rights, most notably, inexplicable court delays. The 
Guatemalan Labor Codes states that the conciliation process should not last more than 
two weeks. But the STECSA-EMBOCEN conciliation process lasted 11 months. 
Between September 2001 and April 2002, EMBOCEN attorneys filed five separate 
appeals and counter-claims before the labor court in an attempt to divert and undermine 
the conciliation process. The court rejected all but one of the motions, declaring two 
“without merit,” and levied fines on EMBOCEN for its frivolous conduct. When the 
conciliation process ended in September of 2002, STECSA filed a strike petition. 
Immediately, EMBOCEN appealed to the labor courts in order to block a strike vote. On 
October 23, 2002, a labor court judge found in favor of EMBOCEN’s challenge, ruling 
that “All workers can participate in a strike vote.” Although the participation of 
confidential employees would not have had a major effect on the outcome of a strike vote 
as STECSA represents over 90% of the workers in the EMBOCEN factory, the labor 
court ruling directly contradicted Article 241 of the Guatemalan Labor Code, enacted as 
part of the April 2001 package of labor law reforms, which states “workers of confidence 
and representatives of management cannot participate in a strike vote.” Subsequently, the 
Constitutional Court overruled the labor court and upheld the exclusion of confidential 
employees. 
Throughout the negotiating process EMBOCEN has withheld the pay of eight 
members of STECSA’s union leadership. EMBOCEN claims that the workers are no 
longer entitled to their union licenses (which compensate union officials for union work 
completed on company time) because the current contract negotiations have not been 
completed and the existing contract is no longer in effect. This again is a clear violation 
of Article 223d of the Guatemalan Labor Code that protects Executive Committee 
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members from dismissal or decline in their labor conditions during the length of their 
terms and for 12 months after they have left the executive committee. 
STECSA has filed numerous complaints with the Guatemalan Labor Ministry 
concerning this issue. On more than one occasion the Labor Ministry has ordered the 
company to pay salaries due to the eight union leaders. But the company has refused to 
comply, incurring fines and citations instead.202 The Labor Courts have been less helpful. 
In December 2001, a Labor Court refused to grant the union a protective injunction 
against reprisals such as the withholding of pay. Subsequently, the Labor Courts have 
been witness to nearly 18 months of appeals and counter appeals in relation to the 
withholding of pay, declining at nearly all opportunities to make a definitive, binding 
decision. At the time of this petition, EMBOCEN is processing dismissal claims against 
the eight union leaders. 
5. Illegal Firings and Worker Intimidation at La Finca Maria Lourdes 
In 1992 workers at the Finca Maria Lourdes in Quetzaltenango organized a union. 
Almost immediately, the owner began a vehement anti-union campaign, which has 
included worker intimidation, death threats, and illegal firings.203 The Union Secretary 
General, Otto Rolando Sacuqui Garcia, was placed in the accompaniment program of the 
Pastoral de la Tierra de Quetzaltenango for six weeks due to the severity and frequency 
of death threats he received.204 Other workers have been detained and harassed by Finca 
security staff. 
Since 1995, 55 workers have been illegally fired by the Finca owner. The labor court 
in the department of Quetzaltenango has issued seven separate resolutions order 
reinstatement for the fired workers.205 Each resolution explains that the workers were 
fired in violation of Article 209 of the Guatemalan Labor Code, which stipulates that 
workers fired without proper authorization must be reinstated within 24 hours. However, 
after eight years, not one of the reinstatement orders has been enforced. On countless 
occasions members of the court staff and even members of the national civil police have 
attempted to implement the reinstatements, but the Finca owner has refused to honor the 
reinstatements, choosing instead to incur fines and legal delays. 
In 2001, the Labor Ministry calculated the total amount of back wages owed to the 
fired workers at Q1,316,367.206 (over $170,000). However, neither the Labor Ministry 
nor the Labor Court has a mechanism for collecting this sum. 
6. Illegal Firings at Salama Horticulture 
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Salama Horticulture is an agricultural export company based in the department of 
Baja Verapaz, specializing in non-traditional fruits and flowers. Salama employs 
approximately 120 workers in variety of occupations: planting, harvesting, classification, 
and packing. In June of 1997 Salama’s 120 workers decided to organize a union. On 
June 30, the workers notified the General Labor Inspector of their intention to unionize. 
On August 27, Salama Horticulture fired 52 workers in retaliation for the organizing 
drive. The 52 workers were prevented from entering the premises by the Director of 
Personnel, the Plant Manager, and the Chief of Private Security. These dismissals were a 
direct violation of Article 209 of Guatemalan Labor Code, which protects workers who 
are involved in the formation of a union. On October 27, 1997, the Labor Court in Coban 
ordered that the workers be reinstated with back pay. On November 17, the 52 
workers and a court officer returned to the Salama plant in order to execute the 
reinstatement order. However, the Plant Manager refused to let the workers back on 
premises, arguing that lawyers for Salama Horticulture had already filed an appeal to 
nullify the reinstatement with the Labor Court in Coban. 
The nullification appeal has remained in the Guatemalan Labor Courts for the last 5 
years. On at least three occasions, lawyers for Salama Horticulture were fined for 
pursuing a frivolous appeal. In 1999, the Guatemalan Supreme Court upheld the 
reinstatement order, declaring that Salama Horticulture’s appeal was “notoriously 
irrelevant,” ordering Salama Horticulture to pay the trial costs, and fining its lead 
attorney. 
Salama Horticulture has also attempted to have the case moved to another 
jurisdiction, arguing that its rights had been violated due to the incompetence of the 
Labor Judge in Baja Verapaz. This measure was also rejected by the Guatemalan judicial 
system. In 2001, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court denied the change of venue 
motion. The court’s decision concluded that the company’s rights to due process were 
not being violated, and that initial reinstatement order was valid. 
Despite these decisions, the fired workers at Salama Horticulture have not been 
reinstated. 
7. Violations of Freedom of Association and Illegal firings at National Mortgage 
Credit Bank 
The National Mortgage Credit Bank (BCHN for initials in Spanish) is a state run 
institution. Initially founded as source of low-interest loans for perspective homeowners, 
the bank now provides a wide range of financial services. The Bank’s directors are 
appointed by the President of Guatemala. In 1998, the Bank began to show substantial 
loses. The combination of risky loans and corruption pushed the Bank to the point of 
bankruptcy. By the end of 2001, the Guatemalan Congress approved a restructuring plan 
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that would include the sale of insolvent investments and bank property, and personnel 
reduction. 
Before the announcement of the restructuring plan, the National Mortgage Credit 
Bank had already been cited for its poor labor practices. In November 2001, the Third 
Labor Court of the first economic zone cited the National Mortgage Credit Bank for 
multiple violations of the existing collective bargaining agreement between the Bank and 
the Union of National Mortgage Credit Bank Employees. The Court’s ruling included 
the stipulation that any and all dismissals must be authorized by the labor court.210 
Despite this order, on March 22, 2002, the Bank fired 170 workers without notice. 
The dismissals were carried out by the Bank’s Vice-president, the Subdirector of 
Finances, and the General Manager. These officials were accompanied by a group of 
armed, off-duty agents from the President’s personal security force. Also present were a 
group of 25 lawyers. It was later reported that the legal fees for the morning’s operation 
cost $43,000.211 At the time of the dismissals, all telephone service in the building was 
cut in an effort to prevent fired employees from contacting their union representatives. 
The e-mail account for the on-site union representative was also disconnected. 
Bank officials explained that the firings were part of an institution-wide financial 
restructuring effort. However, it is important to note that 70% of the fired workers were 
union affiliated. Moreover, these employees were covered by a statute, Law 011, that 
provides benefits and higher salaries for permanent, state employees. It is also important 
to note that Article 19 of the existing collective bargaining agreement dictates that 
automatic termination of employment can only occur in the case of grave infractions on 
the part of an employee. Otherwise, Bank management must adhere to an established 
disciplinary schedule. The employees fired on March 22 were not given any warning or 
prior notification that their employment status was in jeopardy. This is clear violation of 
the collective bargaining agreement. 
On March 26, representatives from the union, the bank administration, and the 
Guatemalan Labor Ministry met in order to find a solution to the labor situation. The 
participants agreed on the following three arrangements: 
1) workers who had been notified of their dismissals would remain in suspension 
until the labor-management grievance resolution committee was better 
familiarized with their cases; 
2) workers who had signed their dismissals would remain dismissed, except in 
special cases, and workers that had not signed their dismissals would be 
reinstated on April 2; and 
3) a negotiating committee would be created consisting of both management and 
union representatives, who would work in concert with officials from the 
Guatemalan labor ministry in order to find a permanent labor solution to labor 
situation at the bank 
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However, the March 26 agreement did not include any binding mechanisms to insure 
that the compromises would be respected. Lacking any coercive powers, the agreement 
was never implemented; no negotiating committee was formed and no workers were 
reinstated. Faced with the failure of the March 26 agreement, the union filed a complaint 
with the Third Labor Court of the first economic zone, asking that the fired employees be 
reinstated. Article 209 of the Labor Code states that reinstatement orders must be 
processed within 24 hours. However, the Third Labor Court of the first economic zone 
did not approve the reinstatement order until June 12, 82 days after the initial complaint. 
In turn, the Bank refused to honor the delayed reinstatement order, arguing that such an 
order did not take into account the Bank’s right to appeal the decision. To date, the 
reinstatement order has not been implemented, six months after the workers were fired. 
On July 25, Bank administration denied union representatives use of their union 
licenses. Such licenses grant the union’s executive committee the right to conduct union 
business during regular work hours. The union licenses were established in the existing 
collective bargaining agreement, and nothing in the agreement gives Bank management 
power to revoke or modify them. The Bank claimed that as a result of the restructuring 
scheme it could no longer afford to have employees conducting union affairs on company 
time. 
Between July 26 and 29, the Bank administration fired another 105 workers. As with 
the March firings, these dismissals came without prior warning. Again, the fired 
employees were overwhelmingly union-affiliated and covered by Law 011. On July 29, 
the UNSITRAGUA labor federation filed a complaint with the International Labor 
Organization on behalf of the union, charging violations of ILO Conventions 87 and 
98212 
On August 8, the union filed a complaint with the Public Ministry after unidentified 
men followed several union leaders home from work. The complaint states that union 
leaders were being watched in their homes and at their place of employment. According 
to the official police report: “[The Union members] were the subjects of reprisals by 
Bank Management for having denounced the administrative practices and poor labor 
relations at the Bank.” As well, the report notes the union’s criticisms of the state-
mandated restructuring plan as a motive for the harassment. 
On August 9, the Third Labor Court in the first economic zone agreed to hear 
arguments on the union’s request for an order reinstating the 105 workers fired at the end 
of July. At this point, Bank management contended that the fired employees “retired 
voluntarily.” However, inspectors from the Guatemalan labor ministry had already 
concluded that the firings were, in fact, firings, and had recommended that the workers be 
“reinstated immediately.” At the time that this petition was filed, the reinstatement 
order was still pending. Lawyers for the Bank had managed to have the case removed 
from expedited labor courts and placed in the regular legal courts. 
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On August 12, 2002, the union presented the Third Labor Court of the first economic 
zone with another complaint denouncing the continuing violations of the collective 
bargaining agreement. The court issued an order prohibiting Bank management from 
firing any more employees without the court’s prior authorization. 
On April 4, 2003, the union reached a partial settlement with BCHN management. 
The settlement covers 15 workers who agreed to accept a retirement/buyout deal. It is 
important to note that this is an extra-judicial agreement. At no time did bank 
management respect the numerous reinstatement orders issued by Guatemalan labor 
courts. The union reports that violations in the collective bargaining agreement continue. 
In particular, the union cites bank management’s refusal to maintain pension funds, and 
the failure to inform new employees of the existing collective bargaining agreement. 
These violations at National Mortgage Credit Bank are particularly striking when we 
consider that the employer, the bank, is the Guatemalan government. That the 
government would condone worker intimidation and non-compliance with it’s own labor 
code is emblematic of the systematic disregard for rule-of law in Guatemala. 
Unfortunately, the state is more likely to perpetrate than prevent such abuses. 
8. Refusal to Grant Public Sector Pay Increases 
The Federation of Public Sector Employees (FENASTEG) filed a complaint with the 
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association in April 2002 challenging section 5 of 
Decree 60-2002, which orders all state entities to “refrain from agreeing to increase 
salaries, award specific bonuses or increase existing ones in negotiations under Collective 
Agreements for Working Conditions. The government argued that this measure was 
necessary to implement economic adjustment policies agreed to with the International 
Monetary Fund, as well as to uphold its Constitutional responsibilities. 
The Committee on Freedom of Association rejected the government’s argument that a 
goal of economic stability could justify a broad prohibition on collective bargaining: 
... The Committee wishes to recall that, on previous occasions, it has indicated 
that if, as part of its stabilization policy, a government considers that wage rates 
cannot be settled freely through collective bargaining, such a restrictions should 
be imposed as an exceptional measure and only to the extent that it is necessary, 
without exceeding a reasonable period, and it should be accompanied by adequate 
safeguards to protect workers’ living standards . . . with regard to the negotiations 
with the International Monetary Fund which the government cites in support of 
the limitations imposed on collective bargaining in 2002, the Committee recalls 
that “a State cannot use the argument that other commitments can justify the non-
application of ratified ILO Conventions, particularly when Conventions 
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concerning fundamental rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, are 
involved." 
In addition, the ILO Committee of Experts has made the following observation: 
The Committee notes that it has been referring for several years to the lack of any 
consultation procedure (in the context of collective bargaining in the public sector, 
regulated by Legislative Decree No. 35-96) to enable trade unions to express their 
views to the financial authorities so that the latter can take them duly into account in 
preparing the budget. In this respect, the Committee notes the government’s 
indication that there exist direct negotiation procedures for the negotiation of 
collective accords for public employees and that consultations with employers’ and 
workers’ organizations are held in writing, through meetings and other means. In 
these conditions, the Committee requests the government to provide fuller 
information in its next report on the consultation and negotiation procedures covering 
the terms and conditions of employment of workers in the public sector, and 
particularly whether sufficient time is given to trade union organizations prior to the 
discussion of the budget. 
9. Anti-Union Discrimination in the Office of the Auditor-General 
The two unions at the office of the Auditor General (Controlaría General de Cuentas) 
has been subjected to a systemic anti-union campaign carried out since 1999 by the 
Auditor General, Marco Tulio Abadiío Molina, who has spoken publicly about his 
intention to dismantle the unions. This campaign has included criminal and 
administrative legal actions, closing and relocation of union offices, and other pressures. 
Some 500 employees have given up their union membership. Many of these workers 
stated that they were forced to renounce their membership involuntarily, and a number 
have secretly re-affiliated. MINUGUA’s investigation determined that these anti-union 
practices violate the worker’s freedom of Association in violation of Guatemala’s 
commitments under the Peace Accords. The ILO criticized the Auditor General’s 
office for continuing to appeal the rulings of labor inspectors who have investigated its 
actions, “the sole aim of this being to delay the proceedings.” 
10. Illegal Firings and Withholding of Back Pay and Bonuses in the Municipality 
of Jalapa 
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In October 2001, the Municipality of Jalapa fired 30 employees - 15 members of the 
municipal workers union, and 15 independently contracted employees. The stated reason 
for the firing was a lack of funds in the municipal budget. The union immediately filed a 
petition for reinstatement with the Labor Court of Jalapa. The Labor Court issued an 
order on November 7, calling for the reinstatement of all of the fired employees within 24 
hours.221 However, the fired union employees were not reinstated until January 25 of 
2002. The 15 contracted workers have not been reinstated. The Labor Court also 
ordered the Municipality to pay the reinstated workers back wages for time lost due to the 
firings. However, the municipality refused to pay until August of 2002, and then only 
agreed to pay 50 percent of the lost wages, threatening instead to file for bankruptcy. 
The Municipality also refused to pay a bonus for 2001, which is mandated by State 
decree 37-2001. Once again claiming a lack of funds, the Municipality refused to make 
the scheduled payments. After nearly a year of negotiations, the municipal union filed a 
petition for a work stoppage and went on strike. The strike was marked by intimidation 
of workers. Union officials have filed complaints with both the Public Ministry and the 
National Human Rights Procurator accusing the Mayor and other municipal officials of 
threatening workers with physical violence and verbal harassment. 
11. Illegal Firings in the Municipality of Tecpan 
On April 11, 2001, 11 officers of the Union of Employees of the Municipality of 
Tecpan were fired. Union officers are protected from dismissals under Article 223d of 
the Guatemalan Labor Code. The dismissals occurred one week after the union proposed 
changes to the existing collective bargaining agreement, and occurred despite an existing 
injunction against the municipality clearly stating that any and all dismissals must be 
previously authorized by a Labor Court Judge. 
On April 25 the Labor Court Judge in Chimaltenango ordered the immediate 
reinstatement of the 11 employees. The administration of the municipality refused to 
reinstate the employees, deciding instead to appeal the labor court’s decision. The Labor 
Court’s decision was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Guatemalan 
Supreme Court.222 
The judicial process has lasted nearly 18 months, during which time the fired union 
members have not been reinstated. The union has filed complaints with both the 
International Labor Organization and the Guatemalan Human Rights Procurator. The 
Procurator’s office has recommended the immediate reinstatement of the union members, 
citing the clear violation of human rights and abuse of power on the part of the 
municipality of Tecpan.223 The union has also filed criminal charges against the Mayor 
of Tecpan, Jose Santos Morales Xet. A report from the Public Ministry states that 
Morales Xet attempted to illegally dissolve the union by organizing city administrators 
into a substitute union after firing the 11 union leaders. According to the complaint, the 
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Mayor and his attorney, Ceasar Landelino, falsified documents and held general 
assembly meetings with only eight employees in which they solicited a vote to disband 
the union. This violates a number of articles in the Guatemalan labor code, namely the 
provision that prevent managers from joining unions and the provision that states that a 
union must consist of at least 20 employees to be a legally viable organization. 
In October 2002, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the 
Municipality of Tecpan. The court’s finding contradicted at least three previous 
decisions by the judicial system. 
The labor rights of municipal employees are frequently violated in Guatemala. In the 
Supplement to the 2001 Report on the Human rights violations in Guatemala, 
MINUGUA highlighted seven separate cases of rights violations by municipal 
governments. The report states that; “[The seven cases verified] illustrate situations of 
intimidation, threats, illegal firings on behalf of public authorities... [such actions] affect 
workers who attempt to form unions or are union leaders.” The cases also illustrate 
how the failure to achieve an effective administration of justice is used to violate workers 
rights.” Although neither the Municipality of Jalapa or Tecpan were reviewed by 
MINGUA, the two cases fit the pattern of violations of workers rights by municipal 
governments. 
D. Child Labor 
Both the Guatemalan Constitution and the current Guatemalan Labor Code establish 
14 years of age as the minimum for legal employment. However, this age limit is often 
overlooked. According to the State Department: “Economic necessity forces most 
families to have their children seek some type of employment to supplement family 
income.” MINUGUA found in 2000 that 34 percent of children between the ages of 7 
and 14 work. A 1999 survey by the National Statistics Institute calculated the number of 
child laborers at 820,000; in October 2002 the ILO estimated that the number had 
increased to 937,000. The largest and most dangerous non-agricultural employer of 
children in Guatemala is the fireworks industry, where an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 
children work to assemble these small explosives in both clandestine factories and in 
their homes. 
In May 2002, the ILO published a report concerning child labor in the main garbage 
dump in Guatemala City. According to the report, the Municipal Dump provides 
informal employment to 250 families, including 850 children. These children work in 
hazardous conditions, sorting and collecting garbage. Most have no access to school or 
health facilities, and many suffer from chronic headaches, cuts, burns, and respiratory 
ailments. Furthermore, the dump’s physical constitution is extremely dangerous; the area 
MINUGUA, Supplement to the 2001 Report on Human Rights Violations in Guatemala, p. 25. 
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is prone to flash fires due to escaping methane case, and the lack of a proper drainage 
system causes the build up of harmful contaminants. By all accounts, work at the 
municipal dump qualifies as the worst kind of child labor. 
The dump falls under the jurisdiction of the municipal government. However, the 
ILO report points out that Municipal government lacks the financial resources and 
political will to eradicate the widespread child labor at the dump. The difficult situation 
of the children working in the dump has been left to non-governmental organizations to 
resolve. 
The ILO concludes that without significant state investments the conditions of 
children working in the dump will deteriorate. However, there is little evidence that the 
government is prepared to accept responsibility for conditions at the dump. In 1996, the 
Guatemalan Congress postponed indefinitely the implementation of the New Code for 
Children and Youth, a measure that would have increased legal protections against the 
exploitation of child labor. And later, the government failed to pursue a loan from the 
Inter-American Development Bank that would have established a project to modernize 
the garbage collection scheme at the dump. 
VI. HONDURAS 
A. Labor Laws and Enforcement Practices are Inadequate to Protect Fundamental 
Workers’ Rights 
The Honduran government continues to tolerate a broad and systematic pattern of 
worker rights violations, particularly in maquiladoras producing apparel for export to the 
U.S. market. The government has failed to adhere to the commitments made to USTR in 
a 1995 Memorandum of Understanding228 and to address concerns raised at the time of 
228
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1. Fine, to the fill extent allowable by law, companies/parks that prohibit access by labor inspectors 
the first time this occurs. If companies prohibit the access, assess the maximum fine of 10,000 
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2. The second time access is denied, the inspector should be accompanied by police to gain entry. 
3. Increase frequency of unannounced inspections in maquila and non-maquila operations. 
4. Complete proceedings to dismiss corrupt inspectors (who have already been identified but whose 
dismissal has not been completed because of the lack of resources to pay severance). 
5. Through administrative action, enforce “fuero sindical” law to reinstate workers who are 
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union. 
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CBTPA accession.229 The government has not lived up to its undertaking in the MOU to 
seek support from all sectors for reforms of numerous sections of the Labor Code that 
have been criticized by the ILO as restrictive of workers’ rights. Nor have labor 
inspection procedures been modernized as the MOU requires. 
The State Department’s 2002 Human Rights Report aptly summarizes the continuing 
obstacles to freedom of association in Honduras. 
The Labor Code prohibits retribution by employers for trade union activity; 
however, it is a common occurrence. Some employers have threatened to close 
down unionized companies and have harassed workers seeking to unionize, in 
some cases dismissing them outright. . . . The labor courts routinely consider 
hundreds of appeals from workers seeking reinstatement and back wages from 
companies that fired them for engaging in union organizing . . . However, the 
right of collective bargaining is not granted easily, even once a union is 
recognized. Cases of firings and harassment serve to discourage workers 
elsewhere from attempting to organize. 
The Labor Code explicitly prohibits blacklisting; however, there was credible 
evidence that blacklisting occurred in the assembly manufacturing for export 
firms, known as maquiladoras. A number of maquila workers who were fired for 
union activity report being hired for 1 or 2 weeks and then being let go with no 
explanation. Maquila employees report seeing computer records that include 
previous union membership in personnel records, and employers have told 
previously unionized workers that they are unemployable because of their 
previous union activity. 
When a union is formed, its organizers must submit a list of founding members to 
the Ministry of Labor as part of the process of obtaining official recognition. 
However, before official recognition is granted, the Ministry of Labor must 
inform the company of the impending union organization. At times companies 
receive the list illegally from workers or from Labor Ministry inspectors willing 
to take a bribe. The Ministry of Labor has not always been able to provide 
effective protection to labor organizers.230 
9. Develop, with the Ministry of the Economy, a system to suspend export licenses for up to two 
weeks for companies that are multiple violators of labor law and engage in 1) physical abuse of 
workers; 2) non-compliance with labor laws relating to working conditions, such as hours of work, 
use of underage workers, occupational safety and health, etc.; or 3) the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. 
10. Seek additional budgetary resources to improve training of labor inspectors and increase their 
salary, in order to reduce the likelihood of accepting bribes. 
11. Explore the possibility of raising additional resources for training and compensation of inspectors 
for maquiladoras through special assessments on maquiladora operations (user fee), by the 
earmarking of fines collected through inspections, or other means. 
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The problem of corruption, noted in the State Department’s report, is reinforced by 
the recent report that a Labor Court judge, Edna Patricia González Castro, and her sister, 
are facing a lawsuit from 2,000 former maquila workers from the Cheill and Dongwoo 
factories alleging that González, who had represented the workers in a lawsuit against the 
company for unpaid benefits, had pocketed over 90 million lempiras in payments owed to 
the workers. 
In addition, the ILO has identified a number of significant problems with Honduran 
labor law, of which the most important are: 
• the requirement of more than 30 workers to constitute a trade union (section 475); 
232 
• the requirement that the officers of a trade union, federation or confederation must 
be Honduran (sections 510(a) and 541(a)), be engaged in the corresponding 
activity (sections 510(c) and 541(c)) and be able to read and write (sections 
510(d) and 541(d)); 
• the exclusion from the scope of the Labour Code, and thus from the rights and 
guarantees of the Convention, of workers in certain agricultural or stock-raising 
enterprises (section 2(1)); and 
• restrictions on the right to strike, namely: 
the requirement of a two-thirds majority of the votes of the total membership 
of the trade union organization in order to call a strike (sections 495 and 563); 
the ban on strikes being called by federations and confederations (section 
537); 
the power of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to end disputes in the 
petroleum production, refining, transport and distribution services (section 
555(2)); 
the need for government authorization or a six-month period of notice for any 
suspension or stoppage of work in public services that do not depend directly 
or indirectly on the State (section 558); and 
the submission to compulsory arbitration, without the possibility of calling a 
strike for as long as the arbitration award is in force (two years), of collective 
disputes in public services which are not essential in the strict sense of the 
term (sections 554(2) and (7), 820 and 826). 
B. Case Studies 
1. Violations of Freedom of Association on Banana Plantations 
a. La Mesa Plantation 
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On March 1, 2001, management at the La Mesa banana plantation fired 19 workers 
after they refused to work overtime. These firings were part of a protracted labor conflict 
on the La Mesa plantation, where workers had long complained about poor working 
conditions, forced overtime, and hazardous fumigation practices. 
As a result of the firings, 58 employees of the plantation formed a union. On March 
24, the Ministry of Labor granted the union legal recognition. In response, the plantation 
management initiated a rigorous anti-union campaign, including bribes, verbal 
intimidation, and firings. Three members of the union’s executive committee have been 
dismissed - Maria Pedrina Gomez, Wilmar Garcia, and Aroque Garcia. All three workers 
were fired despite stipulations in the Labor Code of Honduras that protect the job status 
of executive committee members. In the case of Ms. Pedrina Gomez the union 
petitioned for and received a reinstatement order that has never been enforced. Both 
Wilmar and Aroque Gomez accepted settlements from plant management. 
Over the course of the labor conflict more than 60 permanent workers have been fired 
or resigned and then re-contracted by La Mesa plantation as temporary employees, 
continuing to do the same work as before. These changes in job status are perhaps the 
most effective anti-union tool. According to the Labor Code, only permanent employees 
can join a union. 
In June of 2001 the plantation took the unusual step of legally redefining itself as 
three separate entities, or micro-businesses. The union claims the separation was a tactic 
to undercut its organization. This maneuver had the immediate effect of forcing the 
union to conduct collective bargaining negotiates with three employers, instead of one. 
Moreover, the division chills any future organizing efforts given the Labor Code 
requirement that a union consist of a minimum of 30 workers before it can be legally 
recognized. With 85 plantation employees spread among three companies, workers will 
be severally handicapped their efforts to affiliate the necessary minimum requirements. 
The effect of this anti-union campaign has been to reduce the number of union 
members at La Mesa from 58 to 22. The union has appealed the Labor Ministry on 
numerous occasions to investigate and monitor conditions and complaints on the 
plantation. The response has been inadequate. For example, labor inspectors who 
arrived at the plantation to investigate the March 1 firing of 19 workers ruled in favor of 
management without having interviewed a single one of the fired employees, choosing 
instead to draw conclusions solely on the word of the plantation management. In 
addition, labor inspectors have not resolved a number of pending complaints including 
the coverage of sick days and the failure of the plantation to respect government-ordered 
pay increases. 
The violations of workers’ rights at La Mesa persist despite a written “framework 
agreement” between Chiquita Brands International, the International Union of Food and 
Allied Workers (IUF), and the Latin American Coordinator of Banana Unions 
(COLSIBA) to respect worker rights and working conditions on plantations that produce 
This is a violation of Point 5 of the 1995 MOU between USTR and the Honduran Labor Ministry. 
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for Chiquita. While Chiquita is not the owner of La Mesa, it is the sole buyer of 
bananas, and therefore exercises considerable influence over the policies and practices on 
the ground. In response to the conflict at La Mesa, Chiquita and its subsidiary, Tela 
Railroad Company, convened a commission that met various times with representatives 
of the IUF and the Latin American Confederation of Banana Workers’ Unions 
(COLSIBA). The commission was unable to find an adequate solution to the problem. 
Chiquita told union representatives that its only recourse would be to completely sever 
relations with La Mesa’s owners, thus closing the plantation and leaving all workers 
without jobs. The workers’ representatives decline to pursue this option. 
b. Buenos Amigos Plantation 
The IUF/COLSIBA/Chiquita framework agreement helped workers at another 
plantation producing for Chiquita, Buenos Amigos, win recognition of their union, which 
was formed in August 2002 with 34 workers. Despite this recognition, Buenos 
Amigos management has continued to violate labor rights. The plantation employs 
approximately 330 workers, but only 34 are classified as permanent employees with the 
right to organize. In January 2003, the union petitioned the plantation management for 
collective bargaining negotiations. According to the Labor Code, management must 
respond to negotiating requests within in 60 days. At the time of this report management 
had still not responded, more than two months after the legal deadline. Workers report 
continued anti-union pressures, including offers to workers from management of 
payments to disaffiliate from the union and leave the plantation. 
The most pressing problem at Buenos Amigos is the denial of freedom of association 
to nearly 300 workers whom management has defined as “temporary,” although they 
work year round and in many cases have a long term relationship with the plantation. 
This refusal to recognize permanent working status violates the Labor Code of Honduras, 
which states that temporary contracts of the type used on the Buenos Amigos plantation 
are for tasks of temporal or accidental nature. 
2. Violations of Freedom of Association and Violence Against Union Members 
at the Corazon Textile Factory 
In June 2002, workers at the Corazon factory petitioned the Labor Ministry to 
recognize a union at the factory. However, much to their surprise, the labor ministry 
informed the workers that a union already existed at the factory. Apparently, the factory 
management had been informed of the workers’ intent to form a union and submitted a 
list of names of workers to the Labor Ministry, registering a ghost union. When the first 
group of workers requested to see the notification of the factory union, the Labor 
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Ministry could only produce a list of names without signatures, a critical requirement of 
for legal recognition.236 
Management at the Corazón factory illegally fired union leaders within hours after the 
SITRACOR union was formed on July 27. Reinstatement of the workers was secured not 
by the actions of the Honduran Labor Ministry but by direct pressure on Corazon’s 
owners in Korea, Yoo Yang International.237 
After persistent protest and appeals on the part of the workers, the Labor Ministry 
decided to hold a special election in December amongst all factory employees to decide 
which of the two unions would remain in the factory. As well, the Labor Minsitry 
promised to hold the election at an appropriate hour to insure that as many workers as 
possible would be able to participate in the vote, and to provide security and independent 
supervision of the election. The announcement of the election initiated a fierce anti-
union campaign inside the factory. Workers reported numerous incidents of verbal 
intimidation, firings (including the firing of the union president), and attempted bribes. 
As well, union leaders cite the raising of production quotas as a tactic to discourage and 
exhaust workers. 
Despite the repressive campaign, the SITRACOR union won the special election vote 
with 223 votes out of a workforce of 409 (the company union received 58 votes). The 
union finally received its legal recognition in April 2003, nearly a year after its petition 
for recognition was filed.238 
Problems at the factory persist. Union leaders report the continuation of inordinately 
high production quotas. As well, the attempted bribes and verbal intimidation continue. 
In January of 2003 a security guard assaulted a union member, Lucia Caballero. When 
Ms. Caballero went to get medical assistance, she was fired for leaving her post. After 
Ms. Caballero filed a complaint with the police, the security guard was detained for 24 
hours, but was later released at the insistence of factory management; he is still employed 
at the factory. 
On May 28, 2003 the union sent the Labor Minister a letter regarding 17 unresolved 
cases of reprisals against union members, some dating back to September 2002. The 
laetter notes numerous failures on the part of labor inspectors to present cases on behalf 
of workers, as well as situations where the inspectors concluded their investigations 
without bothering to interview the workers.239 
The conflict at Corazon factory has been marked by the lack of effort on the part of 
the Labor Ministry to enforce and protect workers’ rights. It bears repeating that the 
Ministry was never able to produce the signatures for the company union, and has never 
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been able to justify why the company union was recognized in the first place. The 
recognition of the company union and the scheduling of special elections raise questions 
about the relationship between the Ministry and company management. In addition, the 
numerous complaints filed by SITRACOR in regards to poor working conditions and 
anti-union pressures have been treated with indifference by the Ministry. 
VII. NICARAGUA 
A. Prior Commitments to the U.S. Government 
The U.S. government’s letter to the government of Nicaragua regarding CBTPA 
accession noted the government of Nicaragua’s “assurances regarding the need to insure 
that workers in the Las Mercedes Free Trade Zone, and particularly at the Mil Colores 
and Chentex facilities, are able to enjoy their full rights under Nicaragua’s labor laws. 
We also welcomed assurances that the Nicaraguan government will work to advance the 
implementation of ILO recommendations regarding revisions to the labor code, 
particularly to correct current limitations on the involvement of federations and 
confederations in industrial disputes.” Letter from Charlene Barshefsky, USTR, to 
Eduardo Montealegro, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Nicaragua, October 3, 
2000. 
B. Labor Laws are Inadequate to Protect Fundamental Workers’ Rights 
Several provisions in Nicaraguan labor law raise significant barriers to the exercise of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. One of the most troubling is the 
provision in Articles 45 and 48 that allows businesses to fire any employee, including 
union organizers, provided the business pays the employee double the normal severance 
pay. The provisions that allow an employer to recognize a company union for the 
purpose of blocking collective bargaining demands from other worker organizations are 
another significant obstacle. The State Department points to the lengthy and onerous 
requirements for declaring a legal strike as another factor inhibiting union 
240 
organization. 
The ILO has expressed concern over the government’s decision to suspend dues 
check-off for members of a number of public employee unions. Dues check-off is 
provided for by collective bargaining agreements and by section 224 of the Labor Code, 
which states that “employers must deduct the ordinary and extraordinary contributions 
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established by the trade union according to its statutes from the salaries of workers whoa 
re affiliated to the trade union and give their voluntary authorization.” 241 
In addition, the ILO Committee of Experts has repeatedly drawn attention to the 
following legal defects. 
1) the suspension, due to failure to adopt implementing regulations, of the Civil 
Service and Administrative Careers Act of 1990, section 43(8) which recognizes 
the right to organize, to strike and to collective bargaining of public servants; 
2) restrictions on the access of foreigners to trade union office (article 21 of the 1997 
Regulations on Occupational Associations); 
3) restrictions on the functions of federations and confederations (article 53 of the 
1997 Regulations); 
4) the possibility of a dispute being submitted to compulsory arbitration 30 days 
after a strike has been called (sections 389 and 390 of the Labour Code); and 
5) grounds on which a worker may lose trade union membership, which are left to 
the discretion of the public authority (article 32 of the 1997 Regulations).242 
C. Case Studies 
Workers’ rights have been abused and justice has been delayed or denied in Free 
Trade Zones (FTZs) all across Nicaragua.243 Abuses have been reported frequently in the 
Las Mercedes Free Trade Zone near Managua, as well as factories in Granada, Masaya, 
and Sebaco. Almost all production in these FTZs apparel destined for U.S. markets. 
Workers in these factories who attempt to exercise their rights of free association face 
continuous harassment, firings, and competition from company-sponsored unions, as 
noted in the cases at the Presitex, Han Sae, Rhoo Hsing, Yu Jin, and K.B. Manufacturing 
factories. All of these impediments are violations of Nicaraguan law and international 
norms but are continually met with complicity from the Ministry of Labor and the Labor 
Courts charged with protecting workers’ rights. 
In cases where the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Courts have ruled in favor of the 
rights of workers, either Nicaraguan law has proven too weak to guarantee workers’ 
rights (as noted below in the cases of Rhoo Hsing and Mil Colores), or the power of 
foreign investors has proven too great and its interests have prevailed over those of 
workers (in the case of Presitex). 
These and other violations of workers’ rights in Nicaragua’s FTZs have created a 
climate of fear among workers that keeps them from exercising their right to organize 
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into independent unions. Many years of union busting and the continuing impunity 
afforded to managers that abuse workers’ rights keep workers from organizing, as many 
workers believe it may cost them their job. The most extreme case of using fear tactics 
occurred in the Han Sae factory in August 2002, when union leaders received death 
threats in their homes from factory management. 
Even when the Ministry of Labor takes up workers’ complaints, the institution’s weak 
fines are not an effective deterrent to abusive labor practices. Nicaraguan labor law 
forbids forced overtime, but workers frequently report being forced to choose between 
signing up for “voluntary” overtime or losing their job. Nicaragua’s labor laws stipulate 
a maximum of 18 overtime hours per fifteen day period, while the Ministry of Labor’s 
own inspections of the Han Sae factory found workers with 60 overtime hours worked 
over the fifteen day period. 
1. Presitex 
The case of workers’ rights violations at the Taiwanese-owned Presitex apparel 
factory in the rural community of Sebaco shows examples of union busting and refusal to 
follow through with collectively bargained agreements. 
Presitex Corp. S.A. its factory in Sebaco in 1999, and it currently employs just over 
2,000 workers. In May 2000 workers formed the “Lidia Maradiaga” union, affiliated 
with the Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (Rural Workers Association) (ATC). 
The union received its legal recognition from the Ministry of Labor in June 2000. On 
July 9, 2001, a collective bargaining agreement was signed between management and the 
Lidia Maradiaga union, after nearly a year of pressure from workers and the Ministry of 
Labor. 
The factory continually refused to honor the terms of the agreement over the next 
year and half. On January 15, 2003, management informed the workers that they would 
not be paid the previous year’s vacation time, which management said was due to 
problems with the computer system. The next day, workers filed a complaint with the 
Inspector from the Ministry of Labor, and after a four-hour work stoppage by some of the 
workers, the Ministry of Labor and management agreed to pay the vacation time the 
following week, which brought to light that no problems had existed with the computer 
system. 
On January 23, 2003, management informed workers that salaries and production 
incentives would be modified, without previous discussion with the workers or their 
representatives. This unilateral change in wages was to be applied starting January 27. 
On January 24, a machine operator and a supervisor were fired for their support of the 
union and opposition to the management’s modification of the pay scale. On January 27, 
the members of the union executive committee were locked out of the factory. The 
following day, the Secretary General of the union was assaulted by a factory security 
guard, and on January 29, management locked out the workers for two days 
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On January 30, factory management met with representatives from the Ministry of 
Labor, the National Assembly, the Embassy of Taiwan, and the Lidia Maradiaga union, 
telling those present that they were considering withdrawing their investment from 
Nicaragua. They said they would declare their final intent to divest on February 5, but 
later extended this deadline to February 13. Meanwhile, management also filed criminal 
charges against the executive of the Lidia Maradiaga union. 
On March 3, under the pressure of the factory owner’s threat to leave Nicaragua, the 
Ministry of Labor in Matagalpa authorized the firings of four of the union leaders, which 
was appealed. On March 14, the General Inspector from the Ministry of Labor responded 
to the appeal and ratified and authorized the cancellation of the workers’ contracts and 
eliminated any other chance of administrative resolution. 
2. Han Sae 
On July 5, 2002, workers at the Han Sae factory in the Las Mercedes Free Trade Zone 
formed the Idalia Silva Workers Union, which was given legal recognition and 
certified through the Ministry of Labor. On July 9, the day that the factory was notified 
of the union’s certification, management responded by firing union leaders. This 
provoked a work stoppage on behalf of the fired workers, forcing management to retract 
the firings. 
On July 18, the union declared their intent to seek a collective bargaining agreement 
with the factory. On July 24, they were notified that an agreement had already been 
signed between management and the “Democratic Union,” a company-sponsored union 
affiliated with the Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (Nicaraguan Workers Central) 
(CTN (a)). The “Democratic Union” had been inactive until the day before it signed the 
collectively bargained agreement, July 17th, and they did not complete all the legal 
requirements to be reactivated. Regardless, the agreement, which goes so far as to 
restrict the workers’ rights guaranteed them under law, was registered and authorized by 
the Ministry of Labor on July 17. Because Nicaraguan labor law only allows for one 
collectively bargained agreement in each factory, this illegal maneuver prevented the 
“Idalia Silva Workers Union” from negotiating an agreement. The “Idalia Silva Workers 
Union” was active and certified on July 17, the day the agreement was signed, however 
they were not invited to participate in the negotiation or signing of the agreement. 
3. Rhoo Hsing 
Workers at the Rhoo Hsing Garment factory met to form a union and elect their 
leadership on January 25, 2001. The union affiliated with the Federación Nacional de 
Sindicatos Hèroes y Màrtires de la Industria Textil, Vestuario, Piel y Calzado. On 
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 Idalia Silva was a maquiladora worker who lost her life in part as a result of long overtime hours. After 
working long overtime, she returned home to her neighborhood in the city of Tipitapa at 10:00 p.m. The 
factory bus let her off at a stop far from her house, and she had to walk across a bridge to get home. She 
was murdered while walking home, leaving her family to pay the funeral costs and leaving a year and a half 
old orphan. 
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February 6, the Director of Union Associations in the Labor Ministry notified the workers 
that their union would not be registered. The union executive appealed this decision on 
February 7, and on March 6, 2001, the Inspector General of the Ministry of Labor 
ordered the union to be registered, citing no legal reason why the inscription should have 
been withheld. Over the next seven months management continually rejected the union’s 
attempts to negotiate a collective agreement, culminating in the firing of the union’s 
Secretary General on October 16, 2001. 
On March 19, 2002, the workers reorganized after a general assembly and elected 
new leadership. Management responded the next day by firing three of the newly elected 
leaders. One of these fired workers pursued her legal case and obtained a court order for 
reinstatement, but when she arrived for work she was told she could not enter. Instead, 
management offered this worker double severance pay, which she has refused and again 
appealed. Article 46 of the Nicaraguan Labor Code states that “When reinstatement is 
ordered and the employer does not follow through with the judicial resolution, he or she 
should pay the worker, as well as the indemnity for past work, another sum equivalent to 
100% of this indemnity.” (Cuando el reintegro se declare con lugar y el empleador no 
cumpla con la resolucion judicial, este debera pagarle al trabajador, ademas de la 
indemnizacion por la antiguedad, una suma equivalente al cien por ciento de la misma.). 
While the interpretation of this part of the labor code is disputed, courts interpret this 
wording to allow employers to fire workers, even those with protection as a union leader, 
so long as they pay double indemnity. 
On February 14, 2002, representatives of the Rhoo Hsing Garment factory signed an 
agreement with workers in a company-sponsored union affiliated with the CTN (a), 
which has received funds to support it from Rhoo Hsing management. 
On September 23, 2002, 39 workers at the factory filed a complaint with the Ministry 
of Labor charging two supervisors with sexual harassment. The Ministry of Labor 
confirmed these reports upon inspection. The factory responded by promoting one of the 
accused supervisors, and requesting the resignation of two of the accusing workers on 
October 29, who later quit. The two supervisors then filed charges of slander against six 
male and eleven female workers, with the factory paying their lawyers. Many of these 
workers have also been laid off. 
4. Mil Colores 
The most recent dispute at the Mil Colores factory in the Las Mercedes FTZ ended in 
a negotiated settlement between factory management and two fired workers. Each 
worker had been Secretary General of an independently organized union and fired shortly 
after being elected. After one and two years in legal processes demanding reintegration, 
respectively, the fired workers signed agreements securing them money above and 
beyond their legally owed indemnity. Neither leader, however, was reintegrated into the 
work force. Both cases revolved around the interpretation of Article 46 of the 
Nicaraguan Labor Code, which leaves space for the legal interpretation that management 
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can fire any worker, even protected union leaders, as long as they pay a doubly 
indemnity. 
The union has not been able to reestablish itself, either before nor after the agreement 
between the past two Secretary Generals and management was signed, and there is 
currently no active independent union in the Mil Colores factory. Management has 
signed an agreement with a company-supported union organized through the CTN (a). 
5. Yu Jin 
On November 8, 2002, 22 workers from Yu Jin Nicaragua S.A. at the Saratoga FTZ 
met to form and elect leadership for a union, “Unidad de Trabajadores.” On November 
11, the workers went to the Ministry of Labor to ask to have the union registered. That 
afternoon, six of the union’s leaders were fired, and on November 15, 13 more workers 
were dismissed. 
The union responded by filing formal complaints with the Ministry of Labor asking 
for the workers to be reinstated. The Ministry of Labor responded to the request 
reinstatement of the first six workers by ruling in favor of three workers and against three 
others. Nicaraguan labor law offers legal protection to the 20 workers that sign the 
union’s constitution. Two of the three workers not reinstated signed the constitution, but 
were not among the first 20 on the list. 
Of the 26 workers who formed the union and signed the constitution, 19 have been 
fired. Eight of those workers have accepted indemnification and have chosen not to 
return to the workforce. Six months later, the eleven other workers are pursuing legal 
actions for reinstatement. Nicaraguan law, by only offering legal protection to 20 of the 
unions members, can leave vast numbers of organized workers unprotected and subject to 
firings and abuse of their rights as workers. 
6. K.B. Manufacturing 
Management at K.B. Manufacturing in Granada avoided negotiating and signing a 
collectively bargained agreement with an independently organized union by signing an 
agreement with a company-sponsored union organized through the CTN (a). The 
different processes followed by the independent and company-supported unions show 
how structural impediments can restrict workers’ rights to free assembly. The 
independent union “Edgar Roblero” followed the legal process of meeting to form the 
union and holding an election, and getting the union registered, which by law takes ten 
days, with another ten days to receive certification. When the independent union was two 
weeks into this process, it was notified that the company had signed agreement with a 
union affiliated with the CTN (a), which had not previously existed in the factory. 
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7. Chentex 
The struggle to form an independent union at the Chentex maquila in the Las 
Mercedes Free Trade Zone ended unsuccessfully when Chentex, owned by the Taiwanese 
multinational Nien Hsing, used firings and criminal charges to undermine the organizing 
campaign. 
On May 10, 2001, management at the Chentex garment factory in Nicaragua signed 
an agreement to reinstate four union leaders affiliated with the National Textile Workers’ 
Federation and 17 other union sympathizers who had been fired for union activity the 
previous year. The four union leaders to be reinstated were chosen by the union from 
among seven of the fired leaders who were acceptable to management. The union leaders, 
including those who were not reinstated, received one year's back pay, and financial 
bonuses. Both sides agreed to drop lawsuits pending in Nicaraguan and foreign courts. 
Chentex workers, in coordination with a multilateral international campaign that 
included pressure from the U.S. and Taiwan, had fought for almost a year for the 
reinstatement of union members after management fired or forced out as many as 700 
union supporters in May and June 2000. Chentex, owned by the Taiwan-based 
conglomerate Nien Hsing, also filed trumped up charges against the union leaders and 
sought dissolution of the union, affiliated to the Confederation of Sandinista Workers 
(CST). 
A Nicaraguan court issued a surprise ruling on April 4, 2001 ordering the Chentex 
factory management to reinstate the nine union leaders of the Chentex union. The ruling 
was apparently prompted by concerns over possible loss of Nicaragua's U.S. trade 
benefits. 
Chentex management initially refused to comply with the court order and instead 
offered the fired leaders money to not return. When they refused, management reportedly 
threatened to fire the union leaders again if they all insisted on returning to the factory. In 
May, Chentex and the CST union signed an agreement that accepted back four of the nine 
union leaders, as well as 17 other workers. All workers received lost pay for the period 
from their firing until the signing of the agreement and some of the remaining leaders 
were paid double the severance they were owed and a large bonus. Under the settlement, 
management agreed to respect the union and to drop efforts to dissolve it. 
When the four union leaders went back to work on Monday, May 14th, however, it 
quickly became apparent that the agreement was on paper only. Management told the 
union leaders that they could not organize support for the union in the factory, and they 
were prohibited from talking with co-workers. Over the next week, eight workers were 
fired for reportedly talking with the reinstated union leaders. After a month of continued 
firings, surveillance, and constant pressure to quit, the four union leaders had been 
effectively isolated and ostracized so they resigned. 
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 Information on this case came from USLEAP, www.usleap.org, and the Maquiladora Solidarity 
Network, www.maquilasolidarity.org . 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The labor rights records of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua are egregious, and have been repeatedly criticized by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the U.S. State Department. Labor laws in the five countries 
come nowhere close to meeting ILO standards. Those labor laws that exist are violated 
frequently and freely, with few negative consequences for the violators. There is no 
political will in the Central American countries to bring their labor laws into compliance 
with international standards, to punish violators, or to proactively enforce those laws they 
have on the books. A climate of impunity for labor law violators envelops the region, 
particularly in export processing zones producing goods for the U.S. market. 
Employers in Central America intimidate, harass, fire and blacklist workers for 
attempting to exercise their right to join an independent union. Central American labor 
laws do not hold employers accountable for these acts of anti-union discrimination, and 
the ILO has consistently found that these laws fail to meet international standards on the 
right to organize. Central American labor laws fail to meet international standards on 
freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively in other ways as 
well, by permitting solidarity associations and employer interference, erecting obstacles 
to union registration and industrial unionism, restricting the right to strike and denying 
public workers the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
Workers’ rights will not be fully protected in Central America until the Central 
American countries revise their labor laws to meet international standards. Corporate 
codes of conduct, technical assistance, and monitoring alone will not motivate Central 
American governments to bring their labor laws into compliance with ILO standards. 
Only the threat of withdrawing trade sections can help remove the perverse incentive that 
has been pushing Central American governments to compete with one another in a race to 
the bottom of workers’ rights violations: the incentive of market access and investment. 
By using trade policy to reward countries that strengthen their labor laws and enforce 
them effectively, the U.S. can play a key role in guaranteeing workers in Central America 
their internationally recognized worker rights. 
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